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Defining the emblem1
BARBARA E. HANNA
Introduction and definition of the emblem
Introduction
The term 'emblem' was first proposed with reference to a class of gesture
by David Efron, and it is with his work that I open this discussion of
how the word has been defined and used, and how it might better be
employed. The significance of the label has been modified, and without
arguing for a return to Efron's description, I suggest that present defini-
tions are inadequate. The objective of this article is to show why this is
so, and to argue for a definition which I propose, one grounded in general
theories of semiotics. The necessity of this project of re-definition emerged
during a study of emblematic gestures in the context in which I found
myself as a resident of Australia during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
With little further in the way of introduction, I propose to present this
definition, prefaced by some preliminary comments on its nature.
Given the confused genesis of the category of the emblem, it is unlikely
that one particular trait could be isolated as peculiar to it alone and
established as the hallmark of the emblem. I propose that emblems are
marked as a group by a concurrence of characteristics. As will be seen,
individual emblems have a developmental trajectory, and so emblematic
status may be seen as a point on a scale, rather than as in total opposition
to other sign types. In light of the above, it is to be expected that the
category of emblem should have fuzzy edges, that there should always
be marginal cases, and that some of these marginal cases would never
become full emblems.
Definition
I propose that the emblem be considered as a sign of which the inter-
pretants in a given cultural group fulfill at least the following tasks:
(a) Set up a piece of human gestural activity as a sign
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(b) Set up a sign in such a way that it is usually interpreted as having
been deliberately produced, and communicative intention is gen-
erally attributed to the immediate producer of the sign
(c) Set up the sign as the replica of a type already known, that type
being fairly precise as regards the physical shaping and the inter-
pretation of significance. Strong conventions govern emblems so
that the tokens of the one type closely resemble each other.
It may be noted that, in Australia, emblems generally do not combine
to produce strings, nor are they themselves usually seen as combinations
of other signs or lesser units.
History of definitions
Efron, 1941
Gesture, Race and Culture (the contemporary title) was first published in
1941. Although not inspiring all the subsequent research which might
have been expected, it remains that its author, Efron, is counted amongst
the patriarchs of gesture classification. However, the elaboration of a
taxonomy of gestures is not the prime objective of the book, and it is
rather unsystematically developed therein. This perhaps partially
accounts for the number of interpretations of the work which could well
be considered incoherent with the original text: Efron's definition is
routinely rewritten to fit with contemporary usage.
In his work of comparing the gestures of two American subcultures,
Efron looks at the gesture from three points of view:
— The spatio-temporal aspect: gestures as movement
— The inter-locutional aspect: 'topographic-gestural relationships
between speaker and auditor' (1972: 89)
— The linguistic aspect, i.e., looking at gestures as meaningful enti-
ties. It is when studying this aspect of gesture that Efron finds it
useful to set up the category of 'emblems'.
One of Efron's first steps is to deny the widely-held notion that all
gestures are, presently or originally, pictorial (1972: 95). Thus he can
posit two main categories of gestures, described below, one of which
contains 'emblems'. He later makes passing reference to a third category,
'expository' gestures, which relate to the acoustic properties of a speech
sequence (1972: 121). According to Efron (1972: 96):
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A gestural movement may be 'meaningful' by
(a) the emphasis it lends to the content of the verbal and vocal behavior it
accompanies ... [This] meaning is of a logical or discursive character, the move-
ment being, as it were, a kind of gestural portrayal, not of the object of reference
or 'thought', but of the course of the ideational process itself (i.e., a bodily
re-enactment of the logical pauses, intensities, inflections, etc. of the corresponding
speech sequence). [Efron lists various kinds of logical and discursive gestures.]
(b) the connotation (whether deictic, pictorial, or symbolic) it possesses indepen-
dently from the speech of which it may, or may not, be an adjunct.2
The second category of meaning is said to be Objective' and, given the
importance attached to dependency relations between gestural and verbal
behavior in later literature on emblems, it should be noted that this whole
second class has some degree of autonomy. Efron's subdivision of the
class of movements with this kind of meaning produces a triad very
reminiscent of the celebrated Peircean trio of index, icon, and symbol,
although we can only speculate as to the nature, if any, of the influence
of Peirce's work upon Efron. Here the trichotomy is interpreted as three
separate classes of signs, rather than as three components of all
signification:
[T]he movement may be (a) deictic, referring by means of a sign to a visually
present object (actual pointing), (b) physiographic, depicting either the form of
a visual object or a spatial relationship (iconographic gesture), or that of a bodily
action (kinetographic gesture), (c) symbolic or emblematic, representing either a
visual or a logical object by means of a pictorial or non-pictorial form which has
no morphological relationship to the thing represented. (Efron 1972: 96)
Efron repeats the importance, as a characteristic of symbolic or
emblematic gestures, of a lack of 'morphological analogy' with their
'referents' (1972: 105-106). Obviously he is claiming that while the
physiographic gesture, a sort of gestural onomatopoeia (1972: 121-122),
works with some kind of resemblance between it and the referent (to use
his terminology), the symbolic gesture, even if pictorial, is not an imitation
of the referent's form. Whereas in a physiographic southern Italian ges-
ture (recorded Efron 1972: 202) the thinness of the little finger portrays
that of a skinny silhouette, a symbolic gesture does not have such a
relationship with its object. Any pictorialism 'has nothing to do with the
pictorial qualities of the object it represents' (Efron 1972: 96). Efron
classifies as symbolic a traditional Jewish gesture in which the index
finger taps the palm to signify impossibility: there is no obvious pictorial
resemblance between this manual display and the fact that something is
impossible, the clue to interpretation being the idiom 'this will happen
when the grass grows on this' (see Efron 1972: 175).
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Another important trait of the emblematic gesture is that of consistent
meaning, meaning which does not vary with the linguistic or psychological
context (see Efron 1972: 106). Of six possible Jewish emblems, Efron
allows only two to be 'true' emblems, their meaning being invariable.
This implies the existence of 'less true' emblems, for which there are less
standardized interpretations. However, and here I anticipate later discus-
sion, consistent meaning, even if a necessary condition for emblematic
status, is not sufficient. Rather, Efron also writes of 'gesture-words',
gestures semantically stable enough to stand in the place of words (or
phrases), thus permitting effective communicative use of the unaccompa-
nied nonverbal system. The gestural repertoire of non-Americanized
Italians was found to have a particularly rich gestural vocabulary, which
comprised both 'descriptive and symbolic gesture-"words"' (1972: 116),
with meanings of varying degrees of stability. Both are included in the
dictionary, (drawn by Stuyvesant Van Veen), appended to the 1972
edition, although relatively few iconographic gestures are incorporated,
due to the small number of these with fixed forms. Presumably this
dictionary is the list to which Ekman refers in his introduction (Ekman
1972: 11), but it is curious that, having just reiterated Efron's insistence
on a lack of morphological resemblance as a characteristic of the emblem,
he should describe it as 'an illustration of what Efron means by the term
emblem9. The reason for this apparent contradiction may be Ekman's use
of 'hybrid emblems', discussed below.
For Efron, then, the emblem must be a standardized form with a
standardized meaning, but most crucial is that no relationship of resem-
blance should obtain between gesture and referent. Marginalized in a
footnote is an issue weakening his taxonomy, that of the 'hybrid move-
ment'. (Later he will also use the term 'hybrid gesture' to refer to the
phenomenon of culturally blended gestures in the one individual [Efron
1972: 154ff].) The 'hybrid movement' straddles the demarcation based
on the parameter of morphological relationship between gesture and
referent: 'There exist ... certain cases in which the symbolic gesture
possesses a partial descriptive relationship to the thing represented. These
"hybrid" (referentially speaking) movements are rather hard to classify,
for they fall under two categories' (1972: 96). This should be compared
with a definition of the physiographic gesture stating that it demonstrates
an 'entire or partial, direct morphological relationship to the bodily
attribute or action it represents' (Efron 1972: 105). 'Partial' seems to be
the point of overlap between the two categories. Unfortunately Efron
does not elaborate, but here is the admission of an inherent problem in
his schema, one not occurring in those classifications where expression-
content or sign-referent relationships do not divide the non-emblematic
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from the emblematic. It is perhaps through the 'hybrid' category that the
class of emblems has been opened up: Ekman, for example, has entirely
dropped 'partial' and, after stating the necessity of the non-existence of
an analogical relationship, writes '[i]f the emblem is morphologically
similar to that which it represents it is considered a hybrid Emblem'
(Ekman 1972: 11; 'Hybrid emblem' is apparently his own coinage.) If
the emblem both can and cannot have such similarity, we are left with
no parameters for emblematic status.
Ekman and Friesen, 1969 and 1972
In a 1969 paper Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen, categorizing nonverbal
behavior, revive and appropriate the term 'emblem', acknowledging that,
in applying it to both iconically and arbitrarily coded movements (not
necessarily of the hands), they differ from Efron. Their description of
nonverbal behavior, which is to a large extent re-presented in Ekman
and Friesen 1972, is based on the three concepts of coding, origins,
and usage.
Coding. While coding participates in the description of nonverbal beha-
vior, it does not serve to distinguish any category. It may be arbitrary,
iconic, or intrinsic, with this third option being of little importance to
the class of emblem. Ekman's and Friesen's distinction between arbitrary
and iconic coding can be seen to proceed from the same concern as that
which motivated Efron's distinction between physiographic and symbolic
gestures: 'Acts which are arbitrarily coded bear no visual resemblance to
what they signify. ... Acts which are iconically coded carry the clue to
their decoding in their appearance; the nonverbal act, the sign, looks in
some way like what it means, its significant' (Ekman and Friesen 1969:
60). This distinction, which accords so well with Efron's work, and yet
in its application avoids the problem of the 'hybrid emblem', is also one
which lays itself open to all the criticism of the notion of iconicity,
although Ekman and Friesen recognize that iconic coding involves a
certain amount of stylization. This issue is taken up in later sections.
Origins. Ekman and Friesen are here concerned with the source of a
behavior, with stimuli, personal experiences, and the effect of culture.
Usage, 'refers to regular and consistent circumstances surrounding the
occurrence of a nonverbal act' (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 53). What this
entails is exemplified below, with the case of the emblem.
Brought to you by | University of Queensland - UQ Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/16/15 5:42 AM
294 B. E. Hanna
With these as tools for analysis, five categories of behavior are pro-
posed: emblems, illustrators, adaptors, affect displays, and regulators.
The categories are clearly presented as not discrete (although Kendon
[1981b: 11-12] claims the contrary): it is stated that an act may fall into
more than one of them (see, for example, Ekman and Friesen 1969: 68,
82,92; also 1972: 359). The distinctiveness of the emblem resides primarily
in its 'usage' (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 63): it closely resembles Efron's
'gesture-word', and interchangeability with the verbal becomes the hall-
mark of emblematic status.
Emblems are those nonverbal acts which have direct verbal translations, well
known to all members of a group, class or culture. ... An emblem may repeat,
substitute, contradict some part of the concomitant verbal behavior; a crucial
question in detecting the emblem is whether it could be replaced by a word or
two without changing the information conveyed. (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 63)
While the consistent interpretation of a gesture in a group of interpreters
is necessary to its classification as an emblem, it is also crucial that there
be production of the gesture in the group (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 66).
Hence it is important that an experiment on gesture interpretation be
conjunct with observations of spontaneous productions and tests of
production.
It is essentially the possibility of independence from the verbal which
distinguishes the emblem from the closely related category of illustrator.
This type of movement (gesture or facial expression) illustrates a
co-occurring verbal sequence, and in this case it is the gesture which is
concomitant, accompanying in a subordinate capacity, although in special
cases it may contradict (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 68). Thus, while the
use of both emblems and illustrators is generally characterized by com-
municative intent, and recognition by the user that some specific bodily
action has been undertaken in order to realize that intent, the use of
illustrators is so to a lesser degree: 'the use of illustrators is usually in
peripheral... awareness' (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 358-359). In compar-
ison with emblems, illustrators emerge as potentially weaker (which is
not to say that they are ineffective): they do not necessarily have the
strength to act unaccompanied, nor the same semantic specificity, nor do
they evoke the same consensus on a verbal translation.
Given the similarity between classes, it may be difficult to decide if a
particular gestural manifestation is emblem, illustrator, or emblem used
as illustrator. How can it be that an emblem may be 'used as' an illustrator
(Ekman and Friesen 1972: 359)? It is because the grouping is not pat-
terned on a zoological taxonomy, in which organisms are either χ or y
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by nature, but is based on use: the class of illustrators is very obviously
about the functioning of gestures.
By including emblematic illustrators as one sub-type, we wish to make clear that
illustrators are not an exclusive category; the classification of a behaviour as an
illustrator depends on its usage in a given context. An act can be both an emblem
and because of its particular usage at a particular time also an illustrator. (Ekman
and Friesen 1972: 360; see also Ekman 1977: 52)
A problem in this work is that while an act is an illustrator on the
basis of the use made of it, the entrance requirement for the class of
emblem could easily be taken as qualitatively different. (For one thing,
in contrast to three of the other categories, the name does not include
the '-or' suffix.) The classification of a gesture as an emblem does not
depend on specific situational circumstances, and indeed, may take place
in spite of them. Frequently Ekman and Friesen state that a particular
gesture is an emblem, not modifying the claim with 'typically' or giving
the conversational context. Are emblems then not classed on the basis
of use? No, Ekman and Friesen do imply that there is a general, if not
a particular, context of use, and that is a given culture. Hence, within
one culture, a gesture can be said to be emblematic, but quite possibly
this is the only place where this is so. Certainly, all the types of behavior
occur within cultural boundaries, but Ekman and Friesen claim that,
within those limits, classification of an emblem does not depend on
particular circumstances of use: '[t]he fact that an emblem is shown
without awareness on a particular occasion does not bear upon the
question of whether the action is an emblem; emblematic status is deter-
mined by the shared decoded meaning and the conscious intentional
usage across some group of individuals' (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 72).
The usage which sets emblems apart is the way they are related to
verbal behavior, awareness, and intentionality (1969: 63). Thus behaviors
which might be also classified elsewhere can be emblems if they comply
with those strictures: 4[t]he emblems can include affect displays or adap-
tors which have been isolated by the culture and given explicitly defined
meaning' (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 92). Furthermore, in a particular
instance, the relation to awareness of what is usually unequivocally an
emblem may be atypical, but because the act has generality, complying
with the other characteristics of the class of emblem, it does not cease to
be one.
If emblematic status is not lost even when the relationship with aware-
ness is unusual, there must be further characteristics effective in identi-
fying the group. The 1972 article contains a description listing these. This
description was used by Ekman and Friesen in their research, and, teamed
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with Harold Johnson, they went on to republish it with negligible modifi-
cations in an article concentrating on emblematic gestures, first published
in 1975, and reprinted in 1981 (Johnson et al. 1981 [1975]). This definition
can be taken to underlie most contemporary work on emblematic
gestures.
Johnson, Ekman and Friesen 1975, and beyond
This seminal definition states:
Emblems are those nonverbal acts (a) which have a direct verbal translation
usually consisting of a word or two, or a phrase, (b) for which this precise
meaning is known by most or all members of a group, class, subculture or culture,
(c) which are most often deliberately used with the conscious intent to send a
particular message to other person (s), (d) for which the person (s) who sees the
emblem usually not only knows the emblem's message, but also knows that it
was deliberately sent to him, and (e) for which the sender usually takes responsibil-
ity for having made that communication. A further touchstone of an emblem is
whether it can be replaced by a word or two, its message verbalized without
substantially modifying the conversation. (Johnson et al. 1981 [1975]: 402)
This description is used not only in the American context, but also in
francophone literature, having been reproduced in its entirety in the
journal Geste et Image (Virolle-Souibes 1985: 70), and it is this definition
which Genevieve Calbris suggests is the basis for current treatment of
the emblem (personal communication).
Obviously, such a definition is far removed from that of Efron, and
the issue of'morphological resemblance' has been almost entirely eclipsed.
This can clearly be seen, for example, in the work of Carol M. Sparhawk
(1981 [1978]) on Persian gestures, a study based on the methods of
Johnson et al. Taking emblems as standard forms with standard mean-
ings, she arrives at a conclusion diametrically opposed to Efron's defini-
tion, namely, that emblems are generally iconic in their coding.
Furthermore, pointing, once deictic or an illustrator and not emblematic,
is included as an emblem by Johnson et al. (1981 [1975]: 408). Again,
we can look at Kendon's introduction to his anthology of articles from
Semiotica (see 1981a and b). His interpretation of Efron merits attention,
not because I have set myself up to defend the latter, but because it is
indicative of the general shift in the definition of the emblem over the
forty years which separate Efron's book and Kendon's introduction.
Thus the earlier definition is rewritten in terms of contemporary practice:
'[Efron] recognized symbolic gestures or emblems which can be produced
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in the absence of speech and stand for something in their own right and
can function as an utterance' (1981b: 31).
The definition of Johnson et al. originated in a description of nonverbal
behavior, and despite the modifications made to it, it can still be seen,
above all, as a description of social phenomena: it particularly underlines
the way certain acts are used in relation to words. A more concise
definition than that given above, and one generally held concurrently
with it, describes emblems as those gestures which successfully 'work'
without verbal accompaniment (see, for example, Morris et al. 1979: xx;
Kendon 1986: 17; Washabaugh 1986: 185). It is, in practice, a fairly
useful definition, enabling us to see what would be the object of a study
of emblematic gestures. However, it lacks explanatory power. Why is
there such equivalence? Such questions, in addition to the problems which
arise from the 'word substitute' definition, led me to wonder if we had
sufficiently elaborated the theoretical base to so much interesting practi-
cal work.
If we take emblems as a type of sign (rather than behavior) we can
attempt to describe them in terms of semiotics, attempting to explain
those social phenomena, still remembering that the class is not fixed, and
that signs are used in continual processes of negotiation and modification.
Johnson et al. have shown that the category has stability, that generaliza-
tions are possible, that one can speak of The thumbs up', for example,
as a general concept. At the same time, the group and each emblem
therein are not immutable. It is because general usage may change and
semiotic characteristics be modified, that developmental histories may
be traced.
Although Ekman's and Friesen's original categories were not particu-
larly categories of signification, it is of course misrepresentative to say
that the emblem has not been treated as a sign. As I am about to argue,
it has in particular been modeled on that privileged sign, the word.
Verbocentricity
While Efron's basic classification of emblems describes them on their
own terms, the seeds of definitions dependent on the verbal system can
be found there. Emblems are introduced under the heading of 'linguistic'
aspects of gesture, although all I see Efron doing here is looking at
gestures as language, in the sense of meaningful signals, without invoking
some narrow sense in which the gestures would be expected to accord
with the patterns of linguistics (of verbal language) I However, parallel to
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his classificatory system he does introduce the notion of gesture words,
and this is what has been taken up by so many researchers.
If the emblem can be translated, replaced by words, without serious
alteration of meaning (see Ekman and Friesen 1969: 63; Johnson et al.
1981 [1975]: 402), the corollary is that emblems can replace words,
'replace speech, can act as substitutes for verbal statements' (Morris et al.
1979: xx). Thus the emblem is in an interesting position of independence
and dependence as regards the word. It could be said that here the gesture
is at its most powerful, free of the need of verbal support. Yet, concur-
rently, definitions and descriptions of the emblem are often inseparably
tied to the word. A successful substitute must closely resemble the
replaced, and so the emblem becomes a surrogate word. A number of
issues can be seen as arising from what becomes, in much research, an
uneasy relationship between the verbal and gestural systems.
The muddle towards which definitions tend when setting out to distin-
guish emblems and other meaningful gestures purely in terms of the
parameter of co-occurrence with verbal language cannot be overstated.
Firstly, through a process of reduction, emblems are described as those
gestures used without verbal accompaniment (rather than it being stated
that it is possible to use them without verbal accompaniment). However
useful this rule may be in the early stages of a search for possible emblems,
it is rapidly found to be far too rigid and simplistic.
The movement from 'can be understood without speech' to 'appears
without speech' is made in an article by Fran£oise Abel (1985). Inspired
by Robert Cresswell (1968), she suggests a categorization of descriptive
or illustrative gestures 'allant des gestes redondants par rapport ä l'en-
once, aux emblemes les plus conventionnels qui peuvent etre compris en
dehors de lui' (1985: 42; my emphasis). However, when her five gestural
categories are elaborated, emblems are described as 'ceux qui remplacent
1'enonce. Sans enonces, us sont compris par tous' (1985: 55; my empha-
sis). This rule soon shows itself unworkable as a practical guideline: a
gesture may be understood without words in one instance and an other-
wise apparently identical gesture may be observed in conjunction with
words in another, gestural and verbal messages mutually reinforcing each
other. In the latter case, the gesture lapses from emblematic status to the
other end of Abel's scale, to 'les mouvements redondants'. Here is some-
one caught in the trap which Ekman and Friesen sidestep by saying
emblems can be illustrators. That the presence or absence of verbalization
should be responsible for such a change in status is particularly striking
when the shape of the gesture, even when used without speech, is evidently
closely linked to a verbal expression. Presumably, according to Abel,
whether or not I pronounce 'fingers crossed' while performing the associ-
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ated gesture profoundly affects its emblematic status. In addition to this,
given my observations, it seems that not only may a gesture which 'can
be understood without the utterance' be 'redundant' in a particular
situation, but it could also belong to the other categories, supposedly
contrastive, of 'movements which complete an utterance' and those which
'add a supplementary message' (see Abel 1985: 50, 53). There is a need
for clarity here. For this classification to work, 'emblem' must be seen as
a category of function based on particular circumstances, rather than a
general capacity: i.e., a gesture is an emblem when it replaces speech,
and is not one when it adds a supplementary message.
Nonetheless, even within the framework of this alternative project,
with analyses bound to particular contexts of occurrence, problems of
classification remain. Is absolute simultaneity of the verbal accompani-
ment essential? What of newly-invented gestures, which, not widely
known in a culture, would fail as emblems according to Johnson et al.
(1981 [1975]), but which may be produced and understood without
accompanying speech? During a car trip through the bush, a fellow
passenger informs me: Ί just saw a kangaroo by the road, it was gesture'.
He makes a shape with his hand which, aware of the topic of conversation,
I understand, and for which I could even provide a verbal translation,
such as 'flattened'. However, I am not at all sure that I would connect
'flattened' with the gesture if it were provided again without any clues as
to which characteristics of the hand were relevant to interpretation.
Although unaccompanied by speech, can/should this gesture be said to
be an emblem?
Perhaps, in order to disqualify this gesture from emblematic status
while continuing to define the emblem in terms of a relationship to
speech, we should formulate some clause like 'emblems do not appear
simultaneously or in combination with speech'. Obviously, here we are
starting off after a red herring. Firstly, many gestures widely recognized
as emblems do occur in sentences, effectively replacing words which might
otherwise have appeared there. Secondly, once restrictions such as 'must
not appear in the same sentence as', are introduced, where should the
line be drawn? The quest is futile. Bearing in mind the other emblematic
characteristics shared by the two gestures in the following examples, is it
useful for a definition to postulate some profound difference between
them?
(1) A: So how was it? (2) A: So how was it?
B: thumbs up B: It was thumbs up
What seems far more relevant is that the thumbs up gesture is such a
widely-known, canonized, gesture in my culture that these two gestures
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are said to be the same, and can be understood, be there a verbal context
or not.
I raise one final query about such 'word substitute' definitions of
emblems, which seem to be neither successful descriptions nor explana-
tory devices. Some gestures comment about events and people, whereas
others remark on speech and so are usually simultaneous with it, despite
being comprehensible in isolation. (Examples include quotation marks
made with the index and middle fingers, and the crossed fingers used to
signify a lie.) It seems absurd that this co-occurrence should disqualify
such gestures from being emblems, when their interpretations are obvi-
ously not derived from the speech which at a given moment they
accompany.
The problems outlined above are symptomatic of a more general notion
of verbal language as a 'primary modelling system' (Eco 1976: 172).
Verbal language is seen as the quintessential system of signs, all others
being more or less pale reflections of it. Another version of the belief,
again related by Umberto Eco, is the following:
[Verbal language] could be defined as the primary way in which man specularly
translates his thoughts, speaking and thinking being a privileged area of a semiotic
enquiry, so that linguistics is not only the most important branch of semiotics
but the model for every semiotic activity; semiotics as a whole thus becomes no
more than a derivation from linguistics. ... (Eco 1976: 172)
This exactly fits definitions, such as Abel's, of the emblem as a gestural
substitute for speech. Speech, the mirror image of thought, must surely
be the first option and gesture merely built on it. If verbal language is
the most powerful signification system at our disposal, it follows that the
signs of any other system should be translatable by words, whilst words
would not be translatable into all other 'languages'. This ability to be
translated by speech, which is not the same thing as being necessarily a
substitute, is of course what is claimed for emblems by Johnson et al.
(1981 [1975]: 402): they may be 'verbalized without substantially modify-
ing the conversation'. However, the use of 'substantially' here is impor-
tant: even given the equal possibility of either gesture or word being
produced, one would not be the exact equivalent of the other (on this
point, see also Kendon 1986: 19). For the student of gesture, the crucial
point is this: either the emblem is the true sign, and all other gesture
types fail to make the grade, or we can admit that other gestures too are
meaningful and turn the verbocentric point of view on its head.
With Emilio Garroni (1973), Eco adopts the theory that there are
linguistic and non-linguistic expressions, and the meanings associated
with them overlap, but do not coincide.3 For reasons to be given later, I
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would prefer to say that the classes of verbal and nonverbal signs have
some ability to translate each other, but that this is not all-encompassing.
There are gestures which one can understand but not verbalize, rather
as one occasionally fails to find the mot juste when translating from one
verbal language to another. Yet this failure should not, except in the eyes
of the most chauvinistic, invalidate the claim of the foreign word to be
a word. The possibility of mutual translation between the verbal and
gestural systems could be said to be provided by emblematic gestures.
However, even if this were always the case (remember that there are
other gestures, such as inventions, which are also translatable, and it
could be that there are gestures fulfilling the other requirements for
emblematic status which can only be translated approximately), to use
this as the hallmark of emblematic status is to comply with the verbo-
centric view. If other gestures cannot be translated, the all-powerfulness
of the verbal system must be questioned. To make this admission is to
have presupposed the existence of semiotic systems not patterned on the
verbal, a principle with far-reaching implications.
Freedom from a theory assuming the all-sufficiency of the verbal model
means it is not necessary to describe gesture in terms of its relationship
with verbal language. It is not incumbent upon us to use terminology set
up to study verbal language, or to base the validity of a gesture's claim
to be a sign on how well it measures up to the standards of words.
One instance of this will be seen in the later section on double articula-
tion, this characteristic being seen by some as necessary to the true sign
system (cf. Eco 1976: 213, 228-231). Thus we can view various schema
for describing gesture and facial expression as inspired not only by a
desire for standardized descriptions and a concern for the detail of
anatomical niceties, but also by a feeling that what is necessary is the
establishment of phoneme-like units, that a good scientific (linguistic)
explanation will involve such elements. While not denying the validity of
such a type of research, or of inquiries into whether gestures themselves
may combine together to produce larger units, I question whether we
can justify using the results to decide whether gestures may be counted
as fully-fledged signs.
As a partisan of the importance of the gestural system it seemed to
me desirable to return to Efron in at least one respect: to attempt to
define the gestural system in its own right, rather than making the
emblem's definition dependent upon that sign's interaction with the verbal
system. We have seen that from the verbocentric point of view, emblems
are the most successful substitute for speech produced by the gestural
system, with the power, in certain circumstances, to obviate the necessity
for verbal language. Emblems are defined in terms of their relationship
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with speech and studied as if they were words. In this article I contend
that the verbal system, while powerful, is not semiotically omnipotent.
To admit this is to challenge the idea that emblems must be treated
primarily as substitutes for speech and described as such. In practical
terms, as we have seen, a speech-centered approach is problematic. Yet
to reject the verbal model is not to cloister gesture study into some closed
community with its own esoteric terminology. While bypassing the depen-
dence of the definitions upon other sign systems, it should be possible to
describe the gestural system so that it could stand 'beside' the verbal
system, for example; to describe it so that both could be seen as part of
the same grand network of signs. This is not just an article of faith, or
a point of gestural honor, but a necessity if we are to account for the
way gestures and words work together. The use of one can and does
affect the use of the other, and in the interplay between them, further
significance can be seen to be created. Obvious examples include the use
of a silent gesture in moments of secrecy, or when something inappro-
priate has been let slip verbally. One must needs therefore turn to a
general theory of signs, and to a non-verbocentric semiotics. This said,
it must be conceded that we come to a domain permeated with verbo-
centricity, where a corpus of emblems will consist of gestures which can
be used in the absence of speech. My contention is that whilst we can
use this definition as a tool, we should not be content to remain with it.
Rather, let us investigate what it is about these gestures which allows
them to be substituted for speech, what are the practices which allow
them to be isolated as a group, and let us restate these in suitable terms.
If at the outset, I mean to do nothing more than restate and refine the
Johnson, Ekman, and Friesen definition, it will be found that this opera-
tion will entail a revision of the defined as well.
Semiotic models
In the following sections, I discuss selected aspects of the theories of two
clearly non-verbocentric semioticians, Charles Sanders Peirce and
Umberto Eco, with, as our limited aim, the goal of better defining the
emblem.
Peirce
Peirce elaborates a many-faceted system of sign classification: the distinc-
tion with the most currency is that made between index, icon, and symbol,
Brought to you by | University of Queensland - UQ Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/16/15 5:42 AM
Defining the emblem 303
'the most fundamental division of signs' (CP 2.275). To tidy the present
muddle, we might return to the perhaps Peircean roots of Efron's classifi-
cation and try for a rigorous division in terms of that trichotomy. Even
if we reject this anachronistic project, there is still value in examining the
three categories, given their lasting influence. To do so will be a way of
entering into some of the debates dealing with other classifications of
gestures co-existent with, and in some cases written into, the definition
of the emblem.
The main Peircean depository, the Collected Papers is precisely that, a
collection of papers written over a considerable period of time. It is to
be expected that such an anthology will bear witness to an evolution of
ideas. Thus, attempts to read the papers as a consistent whole will result
in the perception of apparent contradictions. It must also be understood
that they cover a number of areas and are the products of varying genres,
which entails that different things are taking place and that a definition
appropriate in one place may not be in another.
First proposed in 1867, the distinction between icon, symbol, and index
occurs quite early on in Peirce's work, and is one to which he then did
not return for some time. In this version (the chronological priority of
which should not be seen as conferring upon it essential purity and truth),
Peirce is concerned with an opposition between conventional signs, sym-
bols, and natural signs, icons, and indices. In 1885, he returns to the
classification of signs in what Anne Freadman considers to be an abso-
lutely crucial article, On the algebra of logic: A contribution to the
philosophy of notation' (CP 3:359ff). However, he comes to it in a
radically different way: no longer is the basis for the study of signs the
observation of 'natural' sign systems, but rather it is Peirce's invention
of logical notation. Creating a language, he must attempt an empirical
description of it. Here the opposition between natural and conventional
signs is clearly irrelevant. A shift is discernible with regard to whether
the trichotomy concerns three aspects of all signification, or three discrete
classes of signs. Peirce seems to move towards the former in certain of
his papers (see Freadman 1989), and the coherence of this as a model
undermines the possibility of maintaining three separate categories of
gestures, at least when dealing with actualized signs. In the case of the
potential sign, categorical homogeneity may be possible (on the actual
and the potential sign, see Fitzgerald 1966: 50).
The triad of symbol, icon, and index is based on the relationship
between the sign, or representamen, and the object. To deal with this,
we need some understanding of the Peircean sign. Yet his account of
signhood varies during his philosophical odyssey in waters with something
of a Kantian undertow, and also varies, if we are to follow Freadman's
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account, with generic necessity (1991: 103, 104). At times the sign rela-
tionship is one of mediation, and then there are moments when Peirce
recants (reKants?) to clutch again at what Freadman has called 'the
anchors of "the real" and "the mind"', and we read of determination
(1991: 101). Later examples will show why a description of emblematic
gestures should be able to account for untruth, for claimed representation.
In the version seemingly requisite for our own discussion of index, icon
and symbol, which demands the existence of the representamen (some-
times in danger of occultation elsewhere [see Freadman 1991: 101]),
signhood must be figured as based on a triadic relationship between
object, representamen (or sign), and interpretant (not to be confused
with a human interpreter). However, in making this choice I have placed
myself in that genre of Peirce's work in which strict definition is not
possible, and description can best be achieved by exemplification:
[A] word represents a thing to the conception in the mind of the hearer, a portrait
represents the person for whom it is intended to the conception of recognition,
a weathercock represents the direction of the wind to the conception of him who
understands it, a barrister represents his client to the judge and jury whom he
influences. (CP 1.553)4
A sign claims to represent an object so that it is linked to a certain
interpretant. To state an example from my work in these terms, the
gesture performed with one flat hand on the other, propelled forward by
circling thumbs is a gestural representamen, claiming to represent an
object, so that the interpretation, the idea of crawler, should be made,
and this, the interpretant, being itself a sign, stands also in a position to
be interpreted.
The interpretant's function is multifold: it confers the status of sign
upon the representamen, says of what it is a sign, and also indicates how
the (dominant) relationship between object and representamen should be
seen, i.e., as symbolic, indexical, or iconic. These three possibilities will
now be examined, in the light of the object of our mission, which is not,
I repeat, a detailed discussion of Peirce, but a definition of the emblem.
The following sections will deal with:
(1) The symbol: here the role of convention, and the idea of generality
will be introduced
(2) The index: wherein it is to be shown that when dealing with actual
signs, convention cannot be excluded
(3) The icon: this will be dealt with briefly, as background to the
motivated versus arbitrary debate, tackled in a wider discussion
of what Kendon (1981b: 34) has called 'the problem of iconicity'.
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Peirce's symbol. The symbol is a sign linked to its object, not through
any intrinsic relationship between the two, any relationship independent
of the status of sign of the representamen, but rather by habit, by
convention. If we look at a blue peter, a word, or one of Efron's emblems,
there is no obvious link between the symbol and its object, other than
that provided by convention and habit. The word, for example, does not
depict objects, but 'supposes that we are able to imagine those things,
and have associated the word with them' (CP 2.298; see also 1.372, 1.558,
2.292-302). Thus we can already see a similarity between symbol (Efron's
emblem) and word (the model for the contemporary emblem). Obviously,
here 'convention' generally does not refer to a consciously made accord,
although this is not excluded. (For example, a secret society might agree
upon a certain manual sign as a gestural password.) What Peirce means
by a conventional relationship of representamen and object is a habitual
association of the two, 'an established rule of conduct, or habit, whether
conscious (in the sense that the individual is capable of reporting it) or
not' (Greenlee 1973: 95). Peirce justifies his vocabulary with an appeal
to etymology, interesting for us with its connection to 'emblem':
Etymologically, ['symbol'] should mean a thing thrown together, just as εμβολον
(embolum) is a thing thrown into something, a bolt... [T]he Greeks used 'throw
together' (συμβάλλειv) very frequently to signify the making of a contract or
convention. Now, we do find symbol (συμβολον) early and often used to mean
a convention or contract. (CP 2.297)
An important characteristic of the symbol is its generality:
A symbol... cannot indicate any particular thing, it denotes a kind of thing. Not
only that, but it is itself a kind and not a single thing. You can write down the
word 'star', but that does not make you the creator of the word, nor if you erase
it have you destroyed the word. The word lives in the minds of those that use it.
(CP 2.301)
It should be noted that what is described above is the 'genuine' (CP
2.293) symbol, and that there also exist, in Peirce's schema, two necessary
forms of degenerate symbol which involve some kind of particularity (see
CP 2.293; Greenlee 1973: 95-96). If a symbol can only be applied to a
general concept, rather than a particular object, logically the sign itself
must allow reproduction, for it is not restricted to one place and time.
Thus the symbol must not be confused with one of its incarnations;
rather, it has existence outside of any particular realization, and must be
seen as belonging to a repertoire or canon of re-useable signs.
This, of course, corresponds to what has been claimed for the emblem-
atic gesture. It is not a one-off production, but a long-term tenant of the
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minds of members of a community. However, I have seen no indication
that any student of gesture has thought it necessary to exclude from the
class of emblems gestural singular symbols, the existence of which is
theoretically possible, although I am unaware of any widely-known exam-
ples. Certainly, one interviewee in my study demonstrated a gesture stated
to be about one particular person, a poser given to dangling his hand
before him, the better to display his ring and watch, but this can only
have been emblematic for a small group. Generality has for some been
the indication of true signhood, and as such can be seen as another
reason to privilege emblems above other gestures: they can be made to
fit both the word and 'true-sign' moulds, which are of course identical
in many respects.
One final point concerns the origins of symbols, the ontogenesis of
emblems being a point raised as part of a critique of the notion of
arbitrary and motivated gestures as two distinct categories. Peirce writes:
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particu-
larly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons and
symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the
symbol parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is by
thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can
grow. (CP 2.302)
The notion of convention is obviously still applicable to the contempo-
rary emblem. The definition of Johnson et al. (1981 [1975]: 402) makes
continual reference to the usual, the habitual state of affairs within a
culture or sub-culture. If something is the norm, surely it conforms to
the idea of convention. But is the symbol the only sign relying on
convention? In following sections I answer negatively.
Peirce's index. In our study the index is of particular interest, the
nomenclature being so explicitly linked with the gestural. Peirce makes
the equation in CP 2.286: The pole star is an index, or pointing finger,
to show us which way is north' (see also CP 3.361).
In the context of Peirce's opposition between conventional and natural
signs, the index is natural, and can be understood as corresponding to
the indice of French detective stories. It is literally a clue, signifying an
object because caused by it. Thus the fingerprint has as object the mur-
derer, because it owes its existence to the latter. The bullet hole in the
mould witnesses to the passage of a bullet, the symptoms of a disease
are produced by it, the weathercock shows the direction of the wind
because turned by it (see CP 2.257, 2.265, 2.286, 2.304). While the icon
possesses those characteristics which allow it to be used as a sign of its
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object independently of the existence ofthat object, this obviously cannot
be the case of the index, where the representamen is not prescindible
from its object (see CP 1.372, 1.558, 2.248, 2.299). However, the required
link of causality accommodates with difficulty the pointing finger, the
hand outstretched to indicate a chair and other 'deictic' gestures, not to
mention the pole star.
In the 1885 paper dealing with extremely formalized notation, obvi-
ously conventional, causality is no longer the sine qua non of the index.
It is better to say that what now emerges as important is the function of
the index to attract attention without asserting anything.
The index asserts nothing; it only says There!' It takes hold of our eyes, as it
were, and forcibly directs them to a particular object, and there it stops.
Demonstrative and relative pronouns are nearly pure indices, because they denote
things without describing them; so are the letters on a geometrical diagram, and
the subscript numbers which in algebra distinguish one value from another
without saying what those values are. (CP 3.361)
It could be said that causality still is in play in such definitions, since the
interpreter is forced to pay attention to an object (see CP 2.287, 2.336,
cf. Greenlee 1973: 86).
Examples of indices given by Peirce which cannot be explained by a
causal relation between object and representamen include the yardstick,
(CP 2.286), demonstrative pronouns (CP 2.287), possessive pronouns
(indices on two counts) (CP 2.287), directions (CP 2.288), prepositions
and prepositional phrases (CP 2.290) (cf. also CP 2.288 on directions,
and CP 2.289 on pronouns telling how to select an object).
If 'index' refers to the function of a sign when it directs attention to
something else, it now includes designators (and we can see the links
with Efron's category of deictic gestures), although Peirce in some places
asserts that they are not fully indices because of a lack of particularity
or individuality (e.g., CP 2.284). On the other hand, we find descriptions
such as: 'the index, which like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces
the attention to the particular object intended without describing it'
(CP 1.369).
The two traits, the existence of a causal link between object and sign
and the function of directing attention are of course compatible. The
weathercock indicates wind direction because it is turned by the wind,
but also because its observers are constituted so that the pointing weather
vane draws their attention to a certain orientation. Equally obviously,
these characteristics do not always occur simultaneously.
According to Eco (1976: 115), for Peirce gestural pointers (as well as
verbal designators such as those Peirce mentions above) are marginal, to
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the point of deserving exclusion from the category of indices. Yet, in the
article on the philosophy of notation, Peirce states: 6I call such a sign an
index, a pointing finger being the type of the class' (CP 3.361; cf. also
2.286, quoted at the beginning of this section). I submit that Eco's
conclusion must stem from the privileging of the 'natural' definition of
the index to the detriment of other formulations.
It is misrepresentative to say that from 1885 onwards, Peirce never
again mentions the notion of causality in connection with that of the
index. That he does so can be seen either as a mark of indecision or
incoherence in Peirce's work or as a trace of generic difference, which is
Freadman's position (1991). In one instance, at least, Peirce harmonizes
the different descriptions of the index by proposing two sub-groups of
the class (CP 8.368, n. 23, quoted by Greenlee 1973: 87): designations
(attention directors) and reagents (working with causality). Both are said
to function by habits acquired by the interpreting mind:
Just as a designation can denote nothing unless the interpreting mind is already
acquainted with the thing it denotes, so a reagent can indicate nothing unless the
mind is already acquainted with its connection with the phenomenon it indicates.
The awkwardness of maintaining a reading of, and a model of, non-
combinatory categories is becoming ever more obvious. For example,
Peirce writes: 'it would be difficult, if not impossible, to instance an
absolutely pure index, or to find any sign absolutely devoid of the
indexical quality' (CP 2.306). Elsewhere he writes of indexical elements:
in a preposition these are dominant, but as a word it is also symbolic
(see CP 2.290). (See CP 2.260, and the succeeding paragraphs to learn
something of the role of the index in language. For more on the impossi-
bility of the pure index, and on the index working with the icon and
symbol, see CP 2.256, 2.287, 2.293-2.295, 3.363, quoted by Hookway
1985: 131; CP 4.531, quoted by Almeder 1980: 26; Hookway 1985: 126.)
It should be noted that in Peirce's work suggestions of the necessity
of convention for the functioning of indices are not divorced from the
presentation of the index as caused by the object. A man's rolling gait is
'a probable indication that he is a sailor' (CP 2.285). The distinctive
costume and bandy legs of another constitute 'probable indications that
he is a jockey or something of the sort' (CP 2.285). In other words, there
is some kind of rule which, furthermore, is apparently general, establish-
ing the likelihood of things being so. There is a 'law of the mind' (CP
2.286) which compels us to connect wind-direction with the orientation
of the weathercock, or the reaction of camphor with the cleanliness of a
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dish (see CP 8.368, n. 23, quoted above). Is this 'law of the mind' to be
taken as convention?
Rules exterior to the object-sign relationship indicate how to interpret
a sign, and in the absence of these rules, interpretation cannot take place.
Furthermore, many of these rules are general, so that signs, such as
pronouns and weathercocks and pointing fingers, can be consistently
interpreted (see Hookway 1985: 126). Thus, for Holmes, a particular
indice 'automatically' draws his attention to its object, whilst for Watson,
the same detail is insignificant until his mentor has elucidated the rule.
It is plain that general convention not only affects the production of
meaning but also the shape and type of the representamen. The weather-
cock is a perfect example of this, there being no natural mandate declaring
that wind direction should be indicated by crude representations of
poultry (on the conventionality of weathercocks and their uses, see also
Greenlee 1973: 89). This is also evident in gestural deixis. Whether I
point with my lips like some Indians, with my chin like certain Africans,
or with my index finger, as I generally do, is a matter of cultural conven-
tion. Unless one knows about pointing fingers, the fact of one being
poked out is likely to draw attention to itself, rather than to another
object.
Because it asserts nothing, the pure index cannot lie; likewise, it cannot
tell the truth. However, once convention comes into play, lying is possible.
If the index were a perfectly natural sign, produced by its object, the
classic tale of the wag who gathers a crowd on the street by pointing at
an imaginary object overhead would be impossible. It seems, therefore,
that if one can attract attention to 'imaginary' objects, as well as pointing
out the wrong object (cf. Greenlee 1973: 85) it is because a convention
exists which tells the convention-aware interpreter what these pointing
fingers claim to do. (For a fuller treatment of the index and the trickster,
see Freadman 1991.)
This account of Peirce's index has shown a class of sign of which the
definition changes in kind according to its context. In describing it as a
function, we have left the object-representamen relationship aside. In
relation to our own work, we have seen the explanatory power of allowing
conventionality or symbolism a role in the operation of each sign. The
existence of such general conventions can explain intracultural consis-
tency in the use of emblems, as well as their usage in lying.
Peirce's icon. The distinguishing characteristic of iconicity is the rela-
tionship of similarity linking sign and object. Peirce (CP 1.369) writes of
the 'diagrammatic sign or icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to
the subject of discourse'. Examples he gives include such things as 'imagi-
Brought to you by | University of Queensland - UQ Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/16/15 5:42 AM
310 B. E. Hanna
nations of how I would act under certain circumstances, as showing me
how another man would be likely to act' (CP 2.92) and, with certain
reservations, portraits, paintings, metaphors, diagrams, algebraic formu-
lae, and 'a lead-pencil streak as representing a geometrical line'. Similarity
is evidently not restricted to a visual likeness, but may extend to analogies
of structure, as is the case with mathematical formulae, and various
diagrams. (See CP 1.275, 1.558, 2.274-2.282, 2.304.)
The iconic sign would have those physical characteristics it possesses
even if the object did not exist. Those characteristics which happen to be
shared by the object and representamen are what connects them to each
other, rather than any link of causality or convention. To use one as a
sign for the other is to exploit the similarity between them. Because the
representamen would have being even in the absence of an object, it does
not guarantee that such necessarily exists (cf. CP 2.247, 2.299, 2.304,
4.447; also Hookway 1985: 125). Unlike the symbol, the icon is not
general.
Another important trait of the iconic sign is that the examination of
it may reveal information further to that which is immediately evident.
The algebraic formula is a good example of this: while an equation may
be constructed to show one relationship between A, B, and C, manipula-
tion of it will allow the deduction of further information (see CP 2.279).
The existence of the pure icon is impossible in terms of Peirce's schema
of firstness, secondness, and thirdness, since a pure first cannot exist (see
Fitzgerald 1966: 52). For this reason, in some places Peirce prefers to
refer to hypoicons, subdividing the class into three groups: images, dia-
grams, and metaphors (CP 2.277). These signs are iconic, and are said
to be 'largely conventional in their mode of representation' (CP 2.276; my
emphasis).
Peirce explicitly states that everything has the potential to be an iconic
sign: 'Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an
Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of
it' (CP 2.247). Yet, for Douglas Greenlee a damning criticism of the
Peircean icon is that logically, one must arrive at the 'absurd' conclusion
that 'everything perceived and conceived must be an iconic representative
of something else perceived or conceived; for everything is like something
else in some respect' (Greenlee 1973: 75). What apparently worries
Greenlee is the possibility of semiotic chaos through which one's thoughts
would ricochet uncontrollably, with everything signifying everything else
by virtue of inescapable relationships of likeness.
What could bring order to this disordered universe? Greenlee's pro-
posed savior is the idea of convention. However, we did not need Greenlee
to point this out: Peirce himself states that convention plays an important
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role in the use of icons, so that there is no such thing as a pure icon in
everyday practice. For example, having given the portrait as an example
of an icon, he immediately afterward says that it cannot be a pure icon,
because I am greatly influenced by knowing that it is an effect, through the artist,
caused by the original's appearance, and is thus in a genuine Obsistent relation
to that original. Besides, I know that portraits have but the slightest resemblance
to their original, except in certain conventional respects, and after a conventional
scale of values, etc. (CP 2.92; cf. 2.279)
Obviously, there are numerous differences between a living, breathing
person and a canvas coated in paint. Yet, in my own and in Peirce's
society, it is not absurd to perceive similarities between subject and
portrait, because we have been taught that certain factors are to be
counted as relevant similarities. That is, there exists a set of conventions
about what constitutes representative art. The existence of such conven-
tions is highlighted when, for example, we learn to draw — that we learn
is significant — and are taught how the effects of perspective, for example,
are to be encoded on a flat sheet of paper; or when someone or some
group, such as the Impressionists, tries to change those conventions which
are the status quo. In short, the process of representation/depiction is
extremely conventionalized, as Eco (1976: 193ff) or a look at the history
of art attest.
This overview, although brief, should have raised questions about the
validity of a classification of signs based on a claimed strict opposition
between iconic and non-iconic signs. We will return to this point in later
discussion.
Conclusions. It emerged clearly in the above discussion that Peirce's
theory will not sustain a rigorous division of actual signs into disjunct
categories of icon, index, and symbol. It was seen that convention, a trait
of symbolism, operates in conjunction with other modes of representa-
tion, and not only in the domain of logical notation. Thus any attempt
to describe gestures must entail an account of the unavoidable role of
convention. While Peirce clearly acknowledges its importance, it is not
clear, without the kind of involved investigation impossible here, quite
how that is to be viewed relative to the different genres of his writing.
Furthermore, we must leave Peirce if we are to keep up with the contem-
porary definition of the emblem, because the basis of his categories is
not, after all, that upon which the contemporary emblem has its somewhat
shaky foundations. This is not, however, a complete dismissal of Peirce,
since his model will be used to compensate for shortcomings in a model
constructed on a reading of Eco.
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Before moving on, it is opportune to raise one more point concerning
Efron. Certainly, Efron saw his three categories as three kinds of signs,
and as discrete, except in the case of the hybrid. So has Efron fallen
amongst the naive, and claimed that there is the possibility of an actual-
ized pure icon, uninfluenced by convention? Absolutely not. For what is
he doing but investigating differences in the gestural behavior of cultural
groups, thereby saying that gestural signs are a cultural, rather than a
natural, racial, thing? There are traditional Italian and traditional Jewish
gestures, and these conventional signs can be divided into three types.
This accords with what Hookway (1985: 126-127), in his discussion of
Peirce, has to say about symbolic icons, symbolic indices, and symbols,
although he doubts the existence of pure symbols, since indexical elements
are necessary to anchor symbols in reality.
Finally, even if the definition of the emblem is not explicitly based on
three separate categories, it has nonetheless been useful to examine them,
both because of the present aftertaste of a classification constructed on
means of representation, and because of the other issues, such as that of
generality, which we have seen as having relevance to the emblematic
gesture.
Eco
The attraction of Eco's attempt at an all-embracing model of signification
which is expounded in A Theory of Semiotics (1976) is the essential place
given to convention. It is absolutely crucial to understand that although
Eco's theory uses that of Peirce, to move from Peirce to Eco is not to
move to a new, possibly improved, but fundamentally unchanged, version
of semiotic theory. Gone is the tripartite relationship necessary to being
a sign, a mediator between object and interpretant.
A Theory of Semiotics has two major arguments. First, there is an
exposition of a theory of codes, a theory which permits us to speak about
what it is that allows all signs to function, and which makes it possible
for us to group them together as signs. (This dimension is missing from
the work of Efron or Johnson et al.) Second, a theory of sign production
is expounded, where it is possible and pertinent (according to Eco) to
study differences between signs, on the basis of dissimilarities in their
production. Thus it is possible to say what it is that unites all signs, as
well as what distinguishes them from each other.
At the outset Eco defines semiotics and the sign thus:
Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is
everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something else.
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This something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere
at the moment in which a sign stands in for it. (1976: 7)
Convention is necessary to every instance of taking something as a sign,
and so ceases to be a potential parameter for differentiation amongst
different sign-types:
I propose to define as a sign everything that, on the grounds of a previously
established social convention, can be taken as something standing for something
else. ... [T]he interpretation by an interpreter, which would seem to characterize
a sign must be understood as the possible interpretation by a possible interpreter.
(1976: 16)
This is a non-referential model of signification, which immediately sets
it at variance with any theory seeking to classify signs with respect to
real objects. To speak of real objects is possible, but this constitutes an
act of mentioning and is not typical of every sign function. It is a theory
of signification: that is, the signs are signs outside of their use by an
actual interpreter.
Free of the necessity for a real object, ruled by convention, one has a
license to lie: 'semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything
which can be used to lie' (Eco 1976: 7). This statement should not be
dismissed for its apparent whimsy. Rather, it is revelatory of a significant
variation from Peirce. For example, the index, we have seen, attests to
the existence of its object, and the class of reagents must be caused by
their objects: a certain rash must be caused by measles. Now, it is obvious
that if a certain kind of sign must be produced by its object, it cannot
then be used to lie about the existence of that object. So, the question
could be raised: Is it not then the case, that certain Peircean indices
cannot be signs for Eco, because they cannot be used to lie? However,
this is to confuse the issue. Eco offers a different perspective.
What functions as a sign is a correlation of expression and content
units. A certain type of rash is linked to the concept of measles and,
asserts Eco, this holds true whether or not the rash physically is caused
by the disease (or whether the spots were faked, or the wrong diagnosis
made). What allows the link between sign and meaning to be made is
the set of conventions which Eco speaks of as the code. Codes are
coupling devices, making correlations between expression and content
elements, 'providing] the rules which generate signs as concrete occur-
rences in communicative intercourse' (Eco 1976: 49). The result of such
a correlation, a sign, is not a physical or sensible object. To look at the
position of the hands, a word printed on a page, a particular piece of
cloth on a flagpole, is to look at a portion of the expression continuum,
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and to ignore the content. In fact, in moments of rigorously Ecolian
consistency, it is inappropriate to speak of the sign tout court, signs are
not Out there', waiting to be picked up and played with, they are
produced: Ά sign-function arises when an expression is correlated to a
content, both the correlated elements being the functives of such
a correlation' (1976: 48).
Therefore, although for Eco signs do not exist beyond their production,
meaning apparently does come in handy ready-to-use portions, stocked
up somewhere, waiting to be served on an expression element according
to certain well-defined rules. I would prefer the notion of the indivisible
sign: working with another tradition, I reject the postulation that one
could treat separate entities, form and content. Meaning, rather, would
be produced by the expression.
The following examples illustrate the differences in these approaches.
In Australia (and elsewhere, notably the Franco-Belgian region, see
Morris et al. 1979: 108ff) the gesture produced with the thumb and index
fingers touching to form a circle, with other fingers erect, can be interpre-
ted both as 'perfect' and 'zero'. According to Eco's model, the contents
which are the concepts of 'perfect' and 'zero' both could be associated
with the same expression element, namely, the ring configuration. Again,
the idea of victory would be correlated with many expressions, including
the Churchillian victory-V; the arms raised above the head; the fist
brandished aloft. If we follow Eco, we can explain the simple observation
that some gestures and words are interchangeable, by stating that some
content elements may be linked with both gestural and verbal expressions.
Thus the emblem (seen as word-substitute) could be defined as a gestural
expression correlated with a content element which is also available for
correlation with a verbal expression element.
If we reject the model of pre-packaged meaning in a reservoir separate
from signs, these explanations are no longer tenable. What are the alterna-
tives? We may take Peirce's idea of codified correlations between signs,
for each sign has an interpretant, and every interpretant may be a sign.
So Peirce's model is a picture of movement from sign to sign, of unlimited
semiosis, and we may seize upon the concept of one sign translating
another, as we have done in the section on 'Verbocentricity'. The move-
ments of which interpretations are made are from sign to sign, not from
expression to content. This tendency to move from one sign to another
is evident in the results from my experiments on the interpretation of a
battery of gestures. In a multiple choice test in which informants were
free to select any number of responses, they often did not stop with the
'most correct' answer, but chose clusters, such as '"catty (sarcastic)",
"cut upset and cranky"'; or ' "catty (sarcastic)", "Woopee(doo), I don't
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care"' (here 'catty' can be seen as a further interpretation of the gesture
with its central, derogatory sense).
The term 'translation' is particularly attractive in the context of a
search for a definition of the emblem in which gesture is not subjugated
to the verbal, since the fact of translation should in no way undermine
the validity of any of the languages concerned. There would be gestures
which translate words (whether we should isolate them as 'emblems' or
not) and words which translate gestures. In the terms of this model,
gestures can also function as the interpretants of other gestures: the
victory gestures mentioned above may all translate each other. The 'zero'
and 'perfect' rings are an example of homonymy. (Other interpretants of
gestures include: verbal equivalents, definitions, descriptions of usual
connotations, photographs, drawings, and videotaped images of
gestures.)
Of course Eco, too, is attracted by the idea of unlimited semiosis, and
adopts Peirce's interpretant, claiming to 'radicalize' it by placing it into
his theory, a 'non-referential and structural theory of codes and semantic
systems' (1976: 144). In the context of Eco's theory the term 'inter-
pretant', described in detail (1976: 72), is more restricted than in that of
Peirce. It is not needful to spend more time on it here, since the point of
returning to the notion of interpretant has not been to recite Eco's model,
but to demonstrate how we might avoid the necessity of a Hjelmslevian
separation between content and expression to explain certain facts of
gesture use.
It is obvious that my account does not need a mechanism for joining
content and expression elements. Therefore, in the present study, the
code is that which sets up interpretants. With this in mind, many of Eco's
descriptions are translatable and useable.
Eco's code establishes types, models, of which the realizations are
tokens (1976: 50, 178-188, 217-260). These are of course content or
expression types, and obviously for us they must be recast as types of
signs. It is through the postulation of types which may freely be repro-
duced as tokens that the generality of so many signs might be explained.
Each occurrence of a victory-V gesture, for example, is a token whose
production is based on a type specifying what is necessary to the emblem,
what, if any, variations (free or otherwise) are permitted, and what shades
of meaning are possible. To make a victory-V, the fingers must be held
a certain way, and in Anglo-Saxon-derived cultures the palm should be
held forward — a restriction which is not operative in continental
Europe — but the placement of the hand itself may vary. A range of
meanings is also possible. The gesture can speak of victory won, but also
of victory yet to be achieved.
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In Eco we find a statement of the importance of convention which
says that although all signs work in the same way, many of the conditions
allowing the production of signification are culture-bound. We have
already seen that he rejects the idea of the sign being in the place of a
real object. Now we can understand that what the sign stands for is in
fact a cultural construct, rather than self-generated chunks of meaning
or interpretants: they too are conventional.
Although greatly influenced by the Theory of Semiotics in my
re-definition of the emblem, given the differences in our semiotic models,
rather than narrate my exploratory work with Eco's agenda for a classifi-
cation of types of sign production (1976: 217) as a guidebook, I propose
to take the definition of the emblem given at the beginning of this article
and to explain it point by point, referring not only to Eco, but to other
authors and to evidence arising from experimental work. It is a definition
based on a model of signification which proceeds by interpretation.
Interpretation is achieved in the movement from sign to interpretant on
pathways, all of which, even those less traveled by, are created and
maintained, however fleetingly, by convention. These conventions, the
code, within cultural boundaries, set up a gesture, say the thumbs up,
and the possibility of it being actualized and being linked, not only with
previously seen thumbs up gestures, but photographs of it, the idea of
approbation, the verbal expression 'good on ya', and the thumb and
index ring gesture.
'Set up apiece of human gestural activity as a sign'
Only some of the human body's myriads of movements are attended to
as signs. While the emblems are amongst them, others are ignored as
irrelevant or are the subject of only peripheral attention. It is evident
that this stipulation that emblems be produced by human gestural activity
serves to demarcate them from signs produced in other media, such as
flags and road signs, rather than from other gestures, and must be
included because we are working within the framework of a general
theory of signification, rather than one particular to gesture.
For the purposes of this study, what counts as an emblem is limited
to gestures performed by the human hands, with the face and other body
parts operating as adjuncts. This restriction reduces to some extent what
could be a vast field, and also facilitates comparison with other published
collections of emblems.5
Having introduced the subject of the physical matter of emblematic
tokens, it is appropriate to consider here the implications of it being the
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human hands. Charles Goodwin suggests that many treatments of ges-
tures as signs have ignored the fact that they are 'physical actions with
their own distinct properties', whereas he would argue that 'gesture is
not simply a way to display meaning but an activity with distinctive
temporal, spatial, and social properties' (1986: 47). In making the points
listed below, I consider physical and other features of emblems, without,
however, accepting that in doing so I cease to treat gestures as signs.
These properties of the hands participate in the production of meaning.
(For more on the uses of gestures, see the latter part of the discussion
of communicative intention, and Calbris 1990: 173ff.)
— As body parts, the gesturing hands can only be used in the presence
of the interlocutor (unlike the written word), although emblems can be
transmitted in photographs or films, and drawn interpretants of the 'hush'
finger to the lips mount eternal vigil in hospitals. With their ineluctable
insertion of the body into what is being said, gestures seem to belong to
the realm of discours, rather than histoire, and are obviously suitable to
localization and designation (see Calbris 1990: 84), although not all such
movements are emblematic. Indeed, because even standardized deictic
movements must be tied to one particular situation in order to be under-
stood fully, some would quibble about classifying them as emblems.
— Emblems are available to participate in games of proximity. They
may be advanced towards interlocutors and into their private space in a
manner which can be invasive or pleasantly intimate. A gesturer may
even appropriate part of another's body to perform an emblem. For
example, in two separate observed instances, involving different couples,
the woman passes her hand over her partner's head, rather than her own,
to indicate incomprehension. (In one case, it is the boyfriend's incompre-
hension, in the other, the husband is representative of the general public.)
— The hands can take on different configurations and orientations,
which may or may not be significantly contrastive. For example, the
palm-forward/palm-back contrast does produce a difference in meaning
for the Australian interpreter of the 'V performed by index and middle
fingers.
— The hand is composed of various parts. It is possible for one to be
substituted for another, or for the hand as a whole, these substitutions
potentially producing a semantic nuance. For example, in some cultures,
pointing may be performed with either the thumb or the forefinger;
however, the former may be seen as the less polite version. Calbris (1990:
7Iff) discusses the implications of the use of the thumb as opposed to
the forefinger.
— The physical possibility of movement while a particular configura-
tion is being held means that emblems can, and frequently do, beat out
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rhythms, an eventuality not allowed for in systems of classification oppos-
ing emblematic and rhythmic gestures (cf. Calbris 1990: 163, where she
criticizes the opposition of illustrative and rhythmic gestures).
— Limits to cultural diversity of gestures are ultimately linked to the
physiological capacities of the hands, although what these are may be
viewed differently from culture to culture (see Bateson and Mead 1942
for some examples of how hands in repose vary culturally). We could
expect, however, that the basic equipment being the same, there could
be similarity in gestures across cultures.
— Since the hands are instruments in many tasks it is not surprising
that they should sign about such activities, or, by metonymy, about
people or professions conventionally characterized by particular activities
or postures. (See also Vine 1986: 300-301, although we will later question
his terminology.)
— Not only may the hands signify activities in which they participate,
but they are ideally placed to indicate other body parts, or to sign about
clothing or products used on the body (such as makeup) (see Calbris
1990: 69-70).
— Gestures may or may not have acoustic properties. Of those gestures
I tested, only the 'drat' finger click included an acoustic element, which
apparently was useful in distinguishing it from other gestures involving
swinging fists. Because most gestures, however, do not depend on sound,
they lend themselves to use when audible communication is impossible
or undesirable. If we take the example of the insult — which at times
must be administered unperceived by its target, and which at others must
hit home despite difficult communicative circumstances — the possibilities
of the gesture's lack of acoustic properties can be appreciated: a silent
thumbed nose can be produced behind the teacher's back, yet the driver
of the car ahead can see a gesture, even though our words are blown
away in his slipstream.
'Set up a sign in such a way that it is usually interpreted as having been
deliberately produced, and communicative intention is generally attributed
to the immediate producer of the sign
Communicative intention. The stipulation of communicative intention
derives from Ekman and Friesen, who from 1969 onwards have stated
that emblems are performed consciously, that their production is 'usually
an intentional, deliberate effort to communicate' (1969: 63). One can
argue against their claim in historical and practical terms, yet as the
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following discussion will show, there is justification for the inclusion, in
a definition, of some statement about communicative intention.
Any bibliography of the field shows that the term 'nonverbal communi-
cation' (NVC) is used to cover a domain much wider than that of the
intentionally communicative, a trait which critics such as Vine (1986)
view as one of the contributing factors in what is claimed to be an
unhealthy diffusion of the discipline. As Kendon (1981b) shows, in a
history of the development of the label 'NVC' and the importance of
information theory (a mechanistic model of communication as the trans-
mission of information), in this tradition any nonverbal behavior which
may be taken as meaningful or informative is counted as communicative.
Indeed, for this school, emblems would seem to be marginal to the
domain of NVC, because of their obvious, supposedly purely communica-
tive nature. (See Kendon's descriptions of the discipline, i981b: 4, 1986:
3.) Although still working with a transmission model of the passage of
information, in their 1969 article Ekman and Friesen break away from
the tradition of information theory, by distinguishing amongst informa-
tive, interactive, and communicative acts, with the possibility of one piece
of behavior combining two or more of these types. In this triad, 'com-
municative' ('strictly communicative' in Vine's terminology [1986]), is
restricted to those behaviors 'clearly and consciously intended by the
sender to transmit a specifiable message to the receiver' (Ekman and
Friesen 1969: 55-56). 'Informative' is applied to behaviors which are
decoded consistently in a group, and does not imply that they are per-
formed in order to produce that, or in some cases any, meaning (Ekman
and Friesen 1969: 55). There is no doubt some overlap between acts thus
designated, and those signs which, for Eco, are produced by recognition
(see below). Interactive types of behavior have an obvious effect upon
the interactive comportment of other persons. In this definition of 'com-
municative', rather than attention being on the receiver, so that if infor-
mation is gained, communication is said to have taken place, it is focused
on the producer of the behavior and his/her intentions. Indeed, even in
the absence of the passage of a message, for example when the interlocutor
is uncomprehending, behavior would still be said to be communicative
if that intention had been there (see Ekman and Friesen 1969: 56). This
insistence upon the sender's intention avoids some of the problems of
the transmission model: since information rarely, if ever, passes intact
from one person to another in the way that a physical letter does, it is
problematic to construct a parameter necessitating some kind of measure-
ment of success in transmission. If the designation of 'communicative'
depends on the deliberate communicative intention of the gesturer, then
inaccuracies in the message received do not have to be considered.6
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However, major problems remain: the influential definition of Johnson
et al. is still firmly rooted in the tradition describing communication as
the transmission of a message. That very powerful analogy which Reddy
(1979) calls 'the conduit metaphor' is at work here, and the danger of it
is that the non-speaking, non-gesturing partner is figured as passive
receiver, rather than active interpreter. Furthermore, as we have just seen
Ekman and Friesen (1969) acknowledge, dialogue is plagued with diffi-
culties, and 'transmission' can only be a metaphor for the overall result
of a successful communicative exchange after all the various negotiations,
repetitions, and explanations have taken place. Again, the gesturer does
not lose the message as if it flowed through a canal from him/her to
those who see it. It is obvious that my own definition is not couched in
terms of transmission, but rather implies a 'sender' who produces signs,
hoping that they will be found and recognized as such. The receiver, or
interpreter, is the person who takes an object as a sign, takes a movement
as significant, and seeks to interpret it. It is because of the existence of
the code, the conventional system of interpretants, that the method is so
successful, and that conversational partners can so often be in agreement.
Although apparently passive, the 'person who sees the emblem' of the
definition of Johnson et al. does have access to the motives of the
interlocutor. A second, crushing, difficulty with this definition is the
absolute impossibility of ever knowing the intentions of the other. Ekman
and Friesen (1969: 58) argue that 'communicative' be used Only for
instances where there is evidence that the behavior was consciously
designed to transmit a message'. But we must ask: what counts as evi-
dence, what happens if the evidence is inconclusive, and what about those
cases, such as their own example of schizophrenic acts (1969: 56) which
are produced with communicative intent, but which no one notices,
presumably because of a lack of evidence?7 Ekman and Friesen are not
blind to the problems inherent in manipulating the notion of intentional-
ity, as they acknowledge in a footnote (1969: 53). However, they believe
that conscious communicative intention is usually operative in the pro-
duction of certain acts, that these can be distinguished from others, and
these acts they label emblems. For the most part, emblems are communi-
cative, informative, and interactive, but it is the strong awareness of the
intention to communicate which is important in distinguishing them from
other acts (see Ekman and Friesen 1969: 53, 64, 94-95).
Ekman and Friesen may have been those who formally introduced the
idea of'communicative intention' into the field of'nonverbal communica-
tion', thus suggesting that much of it is misnamed, but as a parameter it
is widely used by others: a hand held behind an ear in order to facilitate
the hearing of some soft passage of music would not be emblematic,
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whereas a similar movement, if used to request repetition or an increase
in volume would be. It is not an alternative solution to say that some
actions are 'for real', and that others are purely conventional. Part of
our argument is that convention is an unavoidable, integral part of
reality: how one attempts to improve one's hearing may well be a learnt,
culturally dictated, behavior.
The tool of 'produced with communicative intention' is exceedingly
attractive and we like to think that it is possible to know the intention
of the others, whether a given movement is 'part of what a person is
trying to say' (Kendon 1986: 8), commonly making judgments of this
kind. Even those beginning to study gesture find themselves grappling
with the problem, as the extract from a student's assignment given in the
Notes shows.8 A more generally available source, the Supplement an
Grand Larousse encydopedique also invokes, as a significant distinguishing
trait, the use of a gesture in order to something, before admitting the
difficulties involved: 'lever la main pour rajuster ses lunettes est avant
tout un acte; lever la main pour dire bonjour ä un ami est avant tout un
signe (exactement un «enonce significant»)' (Metz 1969: 536).
It is the conscious use of an emblem in order to communicate that
seems to provide a simple parameter with which to distinguish the study
of emblems from the wider field of body language and enterprises like
that of Allan Pease, whose book, Body Language, is subtitled 'How to
read others' thoughts by their gestures'. It is a guide to raise one's
consciousness of nonverbal behavior: those who have read it should be
able to find more acts informative than before, and furthermore, may
manipulate their own conduct to a limited extent. For much of the book,
therefore, we are in a realm akin to Eco's 'recognition'. An interpreter
treats as a sign something which s/he takes as not owing its existence to
a conscious need for signification: the doctor learns to take certain
physical phenomena as signs, the detective reads the badge left on the
floor as a sign of the intruder (Eco 1976: 223-224), Pease sees the
exposure of the inner wrists as a sure sign of an amorous female (1985
[1981]: 148).
But Eco's semiotics is a loss of innocence: by their nature signs can be
used to lie; what are operative are conventionalized interpretations posit-
ing causality. It is the interpreter who decides that recognition is taking
place, who decides that a sign is 'an imprint, a symptom or a clue' (Eco
1976: 221): the 'give-away' clue may be a deliberate red herring (Eco
1976: 224), and Pease's lustful ladies could be faking it. These signs, too,
may be produced with deliberate communicative intention, and it does
not take too much thought to realize that the intentions governing the
production of a sign can never really be known. Eco takes the example
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of gestures which, to someone with knowledge of various cultural prac-
tices, might 'give away' the ethnic origins of the gesturer. If not communi-
catively intended, this part of the message could not be emblematic. Yet
such gestures may be subject to conscious control, may be deliberately
maintained and used by a gesturer proud of a cultural heritage and
wishing to communicate some message about his/her origins, while feign-
ing unconsciousness about this aim. Similarly, reading the intentions of
a salesperson known to have studied Pease's guide would be difficult. As
Eco says:
[N]o one can escape the suspicion that, as long as the gesture is performed by a
human being, there is an underlying significative intention. So in this case our
example is complicated by the fact that we are dealing with something which has
strong links with communicative practice ... [T]here is always the suspicion that
the subject is pretending to act unconsciously with a specially communicative
intention; he may, on the other hand, want to show his communicative intention,
while the addressee interprets his behavior as unconscious. Moreover, the subject
can act unconsciously while the addressee attributes a misleading intention to
him. And so on. (1976: 18; cf. Calbris 1990: 191)
Perhaps, then, the parameter of deliberate communicative intention
should be abandoned. We have no mandate to follow Ekman and Friesen
blindly, and if, as it seems, this is such a singularly useless rule, since
intention cannot be determined, it might be argued that it will not make
much difference to the notion of emblem to discard it.
However, as has been said above, although we cannot ever know the
other's intentions, we like to think that we can. We need to make this
assumption to avoid a paranoid state in which the truth of everything is
doubted, in order not to be lost in tortuous infinite circles of reading
bluffs and double bluffs, adrift in Eco's 'and so on'. And here is our
solution, in the notion of interpretation: we cannot know the other's
intention, but in some cases we think we can make a reasonable inter-
pretation of it, just as we like to believe the conduit metaphor, or at least
the idea that transmission is eventually possible. To survive, I need to
think that what I have just understood A's gesture to mean is what she
intended it to mean, that I can tell whether it was directed towards me,
and whether I am supposed to know that it was. Because these inter-
pretations are so important in life, it seems appropriate to include them
in a definition. Indeed, Kendon acknowledges the unscientific power of
such judgments: 'it nevertheless remains that participants in interaction
themselves act as if such intentions are readily discernible' (1981b: 9).
Thus it is that he suggests that the category of 'gesture' (of which the
emblem is one kind) is a 'folk category' (1981b: 40):
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Perhaps our question should not be: how can we establish clear criteria by which
observers agree as to what is and what is not a 'gesture'? Rather we should ask:
what are the ways in which interactants, in practice, classify behaviour in others?
We should seek first to explore the distinctions that participants themselves
employ, and then investigate the features upon which such distinctions are based.
(Kendon 1981b: 40; cf. also 1986: 5-6, 8)
For Kendon the best way to answer the question 'what is a gesture' is to
undertake the observation of participants' responses to movements, to
see to what interlocutors attend as a 'relevant part of the utterance'
(1986: 6), and how such attendance is realized (see also Kendon 1978).
To base the category on the interpretation of the gesture is perfectly
coherent with the nature of the sign and of signification in my model,
and is therefore not a stop-gap invoked in a moment of scientific inade-
quacy. That participants interpret in this way, that is, with a reading of
communicative intention, is because that is how these gestures should be
interpreted.
Thus, in the definition proposed, there is a shift from knowing the
intentions of the producer of a gesture, to a statement that the inter-
pretants of emblems carry the information that these gestures are gen-
erally to be interpreted as having been produced with communicative
intent. As a definition, the one presented here not only demarcates an
area for research, but has explanatory power. Because emblems are set
up as usually demanding that they be seen as motivated by communicative
intention, they may be read as if they are, even if this is not the case.
This is what allows those funny moments of playing with interpretations
of intentionality. Satirists rejoice in photographs of prominent figures
inadvertently making inappropriate signs, such as Thatcher and Bush
making their victory-Vs the wrong way around (see Morris et al. 1979:
229; to the delight of the Australian press, Bush was similarly confused
during his 1992 visit). The joke is to ascribe the inapt communicative
intention to them. A similar example is the poster produced to advertise
the 1988 Psychology Ball at the University of Queensland. The Pope is
shown, hand raised with two fingers erect, some iconoclastic wit having
played with the homonymy of the gesture so that we might see the prelate
order Two pots, please'.
Despite our attempted amelioration, this part of the definition will not
always be easy to apply, for reasons to do with communicativeness and
consciousness. These may be illustrated by the well-known gesture in
which the vertical hand is held beside the mouth to indicate the telling
of a secret. The criterion of communicative intent means that those
instances in which it is seen as produced in order to be a screen, and
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nothing else, are distinguished from those in which it cannot possibly be
used to screen, and therefore must be produced in order to communicate.
However, there are many less clear examples. Since gestures are produced
with and in the body, and consequently are suited to signing about
movements produced with the same corporal equipment, predominantly
instrumental actions and predominantly significant ones may be very
similar. Obviously part of the development of an emblem patterned on
an instrumental, not communicatively orientated, action might be some
form of stylization, and in this case the non-communicatively interpreted
and communicatively interpreted representamens would differ, but this
is not always so. Although the gesture of secrecy is available to be used
in situations where screening is ineffective or unnecessary, and may be
held on the 'wrong' side of the mouth, between gesturer and interlocutor,
the secret screen and the secret message can be physically identical. At
times it can be impossible for an interpreter to decide whether the gesture
was produced as a screen, or with the intent to communicate that a secret
is being told. We can also note that in such cases it does not seem
particularly vital to be able to make this distinction, unless one is to rule
on the emblematic status of a particular movement.
Secondly, there are problems in talking about conscious use of gestures
when so many informants claim that they are unconscious of them, that
their gestures just happen. This amnesia is largely encountered in
attempted discussions of gestures, but can also extend to spontaneous
productions. When studying the secretive gesture described above, I
witnessed a colleague perform a similar gesture while calling to her
husband, who had left the room, reminding him of his irksome duty to
telephone someone: 'gesture-»Don't forget, you've got to telephone T-'.
Leaning towards her absent husband, she raised the right hand, with
fingers extended and almost touching, the thumb held slightly apart, and
placed it so that the back of the fingers brushed the left cheek. The hand
beat the rhythm of the words. I immediately questioned my colleague,
who, having no clear memory of the gesture, required that I demonstrate
it for her. As I suggest in a fuller analysis elsewhere (Hanna 1992a: 158
If), the gesture may become part of a secret giving ceremony, and, as
such, is performed through force of habit, with no conscious communica-
tive intent. Presumably it can also be interpreted equally automatically,
with no real attention paid to the issue of intent. Meanwhile, the
researcher, aware that such 'unconscious' productions are possible, starts
to doubt the validity of his/her own judgments about intent. Of course,
one can still restrict 'emblems' to gestures interpreted as being produced
with communicative intent. The problem is that one might begin to be
unable to make confident judgments.
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The starting point for an explanation of the 'immediate producer' of
my definition must be situations encountered in the compilation of a
corpus of possible emblems, specifically, difficulties in analyzing com-
municative intentions in theater, cinema, and cartoons. To take a histori-
cal example, in the 1919 production of The Sentimental Bloke, the said
bloke frequently scratches his head in moments of perplexity. Taken as
an action performed by the character, this can be seen as a habitual
unconscious displacement activity triggered by thinking. Yet turning to
the actor, it is likely that he consciously performs what may 'naturally'
be unconscious, doing so with the intention to communicate that his
character is thinking. What we need here is a way of talking about
different levels of intention, one in which we will speak of roles rather
than people. The mature frequenter of cinema or theater is of course
accustomed to a hierarchy of roles, and in general successfully differenti-
ates between them. Pinked by the poisoned sword, Hamlet expires, and
we interpret him to be beyond possessing any natural earthly communica-
tive intentions whatsoever. Yet we have every expectation that Gibson,
Branagh (or any present incumbent) will live to play another day, and
know that this is not how Olivier died. In a theatrical or cinematic
situation the character is subordinate to the actor, who may make the
character adopt a particular pose, perform a particular movement, which,
it is hoped, will be seen as symptomatic of a state of events affecting that
character. I propose that it is only logical that none but those gestures
interpreted as produced with the communicative intention of the character
be counted as emblematic: other actions, although produced with con-
scious communicative intent by the actor, are not usually marked with
the 'read as produced with communicative intent' tag. As far as the
character is concerned, we may read them as indexical, as actually being
caused by some internal or external state of affairs with which that
character must cope.
To deal with representations of gestures in cartoons and other draw-
ings, it is again useful to propose a hierarchy of roles. The production
of every text could be figured as governed by a quasi-authorial role: this
dominant role manipulates subordinate roles in a text, such as the
different voices involved, or the characters. This role would thus be in
charge of portraying a given character with a hand cupped around the
mouth, in order to show that the character is telling secrets, whereas it
may well be logical to suppose that the character does not particularly
want to communicate gesturally 'Hey, I'm telling a secret', but is using
the hand as a screen. It could even be that while communicative intention
might be ascribed to a series of roles in a hierarchy, the message might
be seen as being different. For example, in a cartoonist's depiction of
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Tasmania (Petty 1976 [1967]), a woman poses mannequin-like amongst
the apple-blossom of the Tasmanian tourist trail. A man tells her 'Relax
Clara, the tourists have moved on ...'. Here it could be said that while
the authorial role wishes to communicate showing off, on the level of the
character, the gesture is to be interpreted differently — Clara wants to
communicate knowledge of her attractiveness to the tourists.
Certain chunks of action (such as head scratching or screening the
mouth) are conventionally significant (of thinking or the telling of secrets,
for example). Therefore cartoonists can offer drawings as translations of
them, and readers are able to interpret such transcriptions, through a
process of recognition, as signifying that certain characters are contem-
plating or imparting secrets. A further aspect of interpretation would
concern the supposed existence of communicative intention on the part
of the many roles involved. In most cases, for a gesture to be classified
as an emblem, some intention to communicate on the part of that role
considered to be directly responsible for the gesture should be interpreted.
In all this, I have not asked if it is true that the emblem is interpreted
as produced with communicative intent. Of course, this is entirely irrele-
vant in the sense that if the emblem has been defined as being produced
with communicative intention, it is pointless, if staying with that defini-
tion, to suggest that they might not be. However, there are two ways of
nuancing the claim, and these explain the 'usually' and 'generally' of the
definition presented here. The definition of Johnson et al. also does not
require that emblems be invariably motivated by communicative desires,
although cases in which they are not undoubtedly in a minority. As we
have seen in the history of definitions and in our discussion of the
categories presented by Ekman and Friesen (1969), there are exceptional
occasions on which the producers of emblematic tokens deny awareness
and intentionality (Ekman and Friesen 1969: 63-64), but these do not
change the way in which the gesture is generally used in the culture in
which it is an emblem. A model based on interpretation might claim that
even in cases when the gesture is not produced with communicative
intent, conventional interpretation could read its existence. However, I
want to make two qualifications to my statement that emblems are
generally interpreted thus: first, there is the possibility that the emblem
might be produced without communicative intent; second, I propose that
even when it is performed as a hopeful act of message-transmission, this
may not be the only function involved.
Here we meet again the thorny question, already touched upon at the
beginning of this section, does communication equal production?
Attempting to avoid the major debates, we can take communication as
it is used in the definition of Johnson et al.: the passage of a message
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from one person to another, understanding it to mean in our terms that
a gesture is offered and accepted for interpretation. Certainly there are
instances when particular tokens of types, unlike other tokens of the
same type, do not seem to participate in such a transaction. We have
already seen examples in which uncertainty about the intent may be
accounted for by the similarity between an emblem and a predominantly
instrumental action, but this explanation is not always satisfactory.
For Ekman and Friesen, non-communicatively produced emblems
appear to be similar to 'slips of the tongue' which give away what the
producer did not intend: this is the explanation of the sincere denial of
having performed an obscene emblem when it has indeed been made.
Yet the case could also be put that non-communicatively intended ges-
tures may be produced without it being necessary to regard them all as
some kind of error. However, corroborative evidence is elusive, because
of difficulties of access to the other's intention. I have already suggested
that possible emblems can be produced by habit, with no high level of
intention: in the case of the secret screen, as we have seen, it is not clear
whether such productions should be counted as emblems. Surely there
are others, such as greetings, or the crossing of fingers when hoping for
the best, which become so ingrained into one's behavior patterns that no
conscious intention is involved. This theory that familiarity breeds uncon-
sciousness is also proposed by the perceptive student quoted earlier
(Mills 1989).
At other times, it seems, emblems could be produced intentionally, but
without the desire to communicate. The use of emblems when alone, or
not engaged in interaction with others, does occur (see Ekman and
Friesen 1972: 363). Struck by a television personality's stupidity, an
adolescent circles his index finger near his temple and then points towards
the screen, without specifically addressing his gesture to anyone: as a
bystander, I interpret the gesture as a spontaneous comment, similar to
muttering 'idiot!' Supporting her claim that denigration 'n'est pas tou-
jours consciemment destine au public', Calbris tells of a fellow passenger
on a bus who, without attempting to initiate a conversation either before
or after performing what for some is an emblem, shook his head as they
passed a drunken beggar (1983: 1123; 1990: 174). Should this be labeled
inappropriate behavior, is it due to force of habit? Are gesturers 'talking
to themselves' and thus constructing a situation of communication with
themselves as interlocutor? We cannot be dogmatic here and so it seems
desirable to make theoretical space for non-communicative productions,
without necessarily asserting that they do occur. Although the gestures
mentioned above were presumably not produced in order to communicate
with either myself or Genevieve Calbris, we both were able to understand
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them. A code existed which allowed us to see those gestures as having
precise signification, and made possible their interpretation, even if they
were not being used to communicate with us.
My second qualification of the statement that emblems are interpreted
as communicative concerns the expansion of the emblem's portfolio. That
is, as a class, emblems may be distinguished as being seen to do communi-
cative work but, for gesturer, interpreter, or observer, individual tokens
may have additional functions not strictly to do with the desired 'passage'
of the message. In the discussion that follows, I refer to Jakobson's
functions of language while acknowledging that these functions are all
said to be communicative, and that, moreover, they are based on a
seminal model of communication as transmission. Similarities between
the list I was establishing and that of Jakobson necessitate mentioning
his. Furthermore, it seems that Jakobson, in counting all of these func-
tions as communicative, is using 'communication' more widely than are
Johnson et al. in their definition: concerned with the stability of the
emblem within a given (sub-) culture, the repeatable and repeated signifi-
cation, they do not give any indication of the varied functions of indivi-
dual tokens.
Emphasizing the 'precise meaning ... known by most or all members
of a group' (Johnson et al. 1981 [1975]: 402), the authors privilege what
in Jakobsonian terms would be the referential ('"denotative",
"cognitive"') function of the gesture. As Jakobson says, although this
'is the leading task of numerous messages, the accessory participation of
the other functions in such messages must be taken into account by the
observant linguist' (1960: 353).
The choice of an emblem may be guided not only by the desire to
make something understood by another but also by a concern for style.
This seems to correspond to Jakobson's poetic function, the 'focus on
the message for its own sake' (1960: 356). Let us take the example of a
drinking gesture used by one of two students in a conversation: '[and
what you did was] sit in [the pub] gesture (snort, snort)'. Here the gesture
means something like 'you were drinking', but the gesture is so much
more entertaining than these words. We may note that, with respect to
the relation between 'gesture' (including emblems) and speech, Kendon
(1981b: 28) writes that the former may be 'a means of decoration or
dramatization'.
The phatic function, for Jakobson focused on the channel, concerns
the management of the interaction, the establishment, and the mainte-
nance of a situation in which communication can take place (1960: 355).
Emblems can be used to establish visual contact in circumstances in
which verbal-acoustic communication is impossible, and in a conversation
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may attract attention and manage the gaze of participants. In the
following attestation we see an emblem being used by a boy searching
for the word for a commemorative flagon.
(A notices B's badge, struck for a jubilee)
A (reading): ' — State High School — Silver Jubilee'.
C: My school had its jubilee ... What did they have for our Silver Jubilee?
A: The ... port stuff ...
C: What?
A: You know, the gesture — the drink stuff.
C: Oh yes, the flagon.
gesture: The right hand is held in front of the chest, with the fingers
together and slightly curved. The pad of the horizontal thumb rests
against the pads of the index and middle fingers. Moving from the wrist,
the hand rotates almost 90° towards the body, then falls back to its
starting point. The movement is repeated once or twice.
(A: male, 13, high school student, born — Brisbane, schooling —
Brisbane; B: the researcher; C: (A's father) male, late thirties, draughts-
man, born — Australia.)
By producing the emblem, the boy does not surrender his role as message
producer, despite his verbal shortcomings. (See Goodwin 1986 for exam-
ples of non-emblematic gestures being used to manipulate the attention
of co-conversationalists.)
It has frequently been remarked that gestures seem to play a priming
role, helping the gesturer in the preparation and delivery of a verbal
utterance. Emblems would not be excluded from this, and if anticipating
a word, they can hardly be said to be substituted for it, or to replace it
just prior to emission. For example, gestures are often used when tele-
phoning, and the difficulty of suppressing them suggests that this is not
merely due to forgetful inappropriateness. Similarly, it is extremely hard
to give directions without using gestures such as the emblematic pointing.
(See also Calbris 1990: 193-194.) Centered on the gesturer, as Jakobson's
emotive or expressive function is 'focused on the ADDRESSER' (1960: 354),
this priming role does, however, differ from the latter in that it is not
about the expression of the emotions. Undertaken in verbal language by
interjections, the emotive function could be seen in gestural examples
such as the two of doubtful communicative intent given above. The
Australian adolescent and the French bus passenger both react gesturally.
Also relevant here would be information as to the mood of the gesturer
apparently carried by an emblem: an emblem may be performed in a
more, or less, impassioned manner, for example.
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For Jakobson, insofar as attention is directed to the addressee of an
utterance, that utterance has a conative function: this is obviously the
role of vocatives and imperatives. Similarly, emblems can be used to
command. In cases where an emblem derives from an instrumental action,
such as a drinking gesture or some of those for secrecy, the possibility
of deploying it about another person, and/or to provoke a future action
seems an important stage in attaining generality.
Above, we have referred to the boy attempting to make his father
recall a commemorative flagon. The boy's gesture works, as we said, to
retain the message-producing role but also as a gloss on what has been
and will be said. The 'port stuff' is a drink. When emblems work to
explain words, to comment on language, their function is akin to
Jakobson's metalingual function:
Whenever the addresser and/or the addressee need to check up whether they use
the same code, speech is focused on the CODE: it performs a METALINGUAL (i.e.,
glossing) function. Ί don't follow you — what do you mean?' asks the addressee
... And the addresser in anticipation of such recapturing questions inquires: 'Do
you know what I mean?' (1960: 356)
This metalingual function would also be performed, presumably, by
emblems offered as translations of, or alternatives to, other gestures or
words. Personally, I frequently use emblems as a gloss, having learnt to
illustrate Tm studying Australian gestures' with one or two common
emblems: 'gestures' is such an unexpected item that it is often not under-
stood. This practice is particularly interesting as an instance of the use
of examples, and thus of ostension (see the section Ostension' and Eco
1976: 224-227). The standard, cultural meaning is still necessarily present,
but is overshadowed: if I perform the thumbs up, it is not to say 'great',
but to signify that class of movements of which the thumbs up, meaning
'great', is a member.
In addition to these functions paralleling those of verbal language, an
emblematic token may act in ways proper to the gestural system, and to
which we have alluded earlier, in the section on these signs as part of
human gestural behavior. For example, simultaneous with words, and
while produced with their general meaning, such tokens may also empha-
size rhythmically the verbal utterance, possibly facilitating its perception
by the interlocutor.
Conclusions. Emblems have been defined as gestures distinguished by
the strongly conscious communicative intentions of their producers. In
this section I have tried to show how communicative intention might be
relevant within the framework of a definition based on a model of
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interpretation. Care has been taken to avoid unquestioning acceptance
of the terms of the conduit metaphor in discussing communication, and
the 'knows' of Johnson et al. has been replaced by 'interprets'. This is
not only consistent with the model, but seems a more just picture of
what happens in the understanding of an emblem. To inflict 'know' upon
researchers dooms them to unnecessary failure, given that intentions are
unknowable. The field of gestures is rich in demonstrations of the diffi-
culties both of knowing and interpreting the communicative intentions
of interlocutors: witness the claimed unconsciousness of many peoples'
gestures, and the fact that gestures may be derived from actions which
are not communicatively intended. The growth of emblems from purely
instrumental actions explains the existence of some of those fuzzy edges
spoken of in the introduction to the definition. Central members of the
class of emblems are marked, in the system of interpretants established
by the code, as being open to the interpretation that they were produced
with intent to communicate. In the case of particular tokens, this inter-
pretation may not always be appropriate. Furthermore, individual tokens
may do more than signify to an interpreter the canonized meaning: they
may also have an idiosyncratic connotation and poetic, emotive, phatic
value etc., and/or indicate membership of a cultural group.
'Set up the sign as the replica of a type already known, that type being
fairly precise as regards the physical shaping and the interpretation of
significance. Strong conventions govern emblems so that the tokens of the
one type closely resemble each other'
Replication. In earlier discussion of models of signhood, and specifically
the code, I alluded to those signs which can usefully be treated as types
actualized as tokens. This part of the definition describes the emblem as
such, and it is the purpose of the following section to rehearse why it
seems appropriate to do so. In using the term replication to refer to this
(re) production of an archetypical sign, I am again appropriating vocabu-
lary used in Eco's Theory of Semiotics, while using it in terms of sign-
types, rather than of expression or content elements. A replica is a token
reproducing the essential details of some model sign, while other aspects,
by convention, may differ. Token differs from type and tokens of the
same type may differ from each other (see Eco 1976: 182-183). Indeed,
if we are to follow Eco, who, because of the complexities of the human
body, and our imperfect knowledge of its workings, states that we are
not in a position to label any two instances of the one spoken word
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absolute doubles (perfect replicas of the model), we can never claim
more congruence than this.
Before going on to the detail of the discussion of the emblem as replica,
I will briefly set out a number of reflections inspired by other of Eco's
categories of physical labor operative in the production of expression
elements. There are three of these categories in addition to replication.
'Recognition' we have already seen, and have said the production of
signs by recognition does not cover that of the emblem, because the latter
is generally seen as communicatively intended. The interest of the discus-
sion of ostension and invention is that it demonstrates the kinds of
gestures excluded by the definition, and possible origins of emblems.
Ostension. If unprepared to envisage possible differences between word
and emblem, apart from the verbal/gestural contrast, we would pass over
ostension, since the word is not classified here. However, production by
ostension may be a step in the developmental path towards emblematic
status. For Eco, ostension Occurs when a given object or event produced
by nature or human action ... is "picked up" by someone and shown as
the expression of the class of which it is a member' (1976: 224-225).
This is how samples and examples are produced. As we have already
seen, particular actions, such as masking the mouth when telling a secret,
or cooling oneself by moving the collar when stressed, have been taken
up and produced as significant of secrecy and discomfort. Actions have
been 'sampled', but the emblems thus derived are no longer produced by
ostension. Insofar as they are standardized and generalized, they cease
to be based directly on the action. Even in the first production of the
gesture, there is already movement away from ostension and towards
replication, because there is a reproduction of a particular pattern. We
have what Eco would call a 'fictive sample', a label he applies to the
'intrinsically coded acts' of Ekman and Friesen (Eco 1976: 227). What
distinguishes intrinsically coded acts from other samples is that the gesture
must be made for the occasion, rather than merely using a pre-existent
object. Ekman and Friesen suggest that emblems are rarely coded intrinsi-
cally, since standardization due to frequent use means that the shapes of
emblems deviate from their originals, and so they are more properly cast
as iconic (1969: 65). I question whether 'iconic' is any more suitable and
suggest that the refinement of the shape due to factors other than coding
might imply that coding itself is not of prime importance.
Although it is generally not useful to regard established emblems as
produced by ostension, it should be mentioned that the video tape used
with my experimental subjects is composed entirely of fictive samples.
That is, the gestures were enacted to signify, for example, the gesture
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which might be interpreted as 'mental anxiety', rather than mental anxiety
itself. Rules in surrounding ceremonies overrode the more 'normal' use.
Further framing devices in the experiment tell the informants what to do
with this: yes, Gesture 74 may mean 'all thumbs up signs', but subjects
should indicate how thumbs up signs should be interpreted. Indeed,
different kinds of answers are produced. Some participants presumably
see the gesture as a sample, and annotate their suggested translations
with general indications of usage such as 'used to suggest annoyance with
another person, usually a child or a subordinate', while others apparently
imagine for themselves a situation, so that the gesture is no longer a
sample of its fellow-tokens, but is translated as, for example, Ί wanted
to strangle her' (responses to a gesture in which the two curved hands
are held as if around an invisible neck, and shaken).
Invention. Given its widespread use in a culture, an emblem cannot be
produced by invention. However, through adoption and use by a com-
munity, a posited convention may be ratified (see section on justification).
For the fledgling gesture to work, as did the 'flattened kangaroo' gesture
referred to above, something must allow the interlocutor to deduce the
existence of the gesturer's new convention. In the case of a successful
outcome, we might reasonably expect that there should be some justifica-
tion of that convention. Furthermore, such gestures are not complete
novelties: they rely on cultural presuppositions and general knowledge
(such as expectations concerning the fate and condition of roadside
marsupials). Yet at the stage at which the eventual emblem is still an
invention, it is only a prototype, and there is as yet no archetype of
which actualized emblems would be the tokens.
Emblems as replicas. Of replication, Eco writes This mode of pro-
duction governs the most usual elements of expression, so that, when
defining the notion of sign, one takes into account only replicable objects
intentionally produced in order to signify' (1976: 227-228). His examples
of such expression elements include 'various coded kinesic features (for
instance, gestures meaning «come here», «yes», «no» and so on', predict-
ably in close company with 'morphemes' (1976: 228).
In the present article, to say that an emblem is a replica is not to be
committed to any model of replicable combinational units, but to empha-
size that the production of an emblem is the production of the token of
a type, a gesture made according to a pre-existent pattern, this pattern
describing the physical manifestation of the gesture, and its interpretative
possibilities. Descriptions of such types may be collected in dictionaries.
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Describing the emblem as a replica of a type accounts for its generality
in a culture and various other attested phenomena. By corollary, these
phenomenon may suggest that a particular gesture is emblematic. Firstly,
the existence of a type is implied by the fact that a gesture has a name,
although David McNeill (1986: 107) overgeneralizes when he says that
all emblems are named. Labels such as 'thumbs up', 'thumbs down', and
'victory-V are commonly used to refer to certain gestures, no detailed
explanation being deemed necessary, thus indicating the existence of some
archetypal 'thumbs up' and so on for a culture. The following are exam-
ples of the practice:
— A journalist, describing the deportation of a prisoner after a
campaign for his release: 'As he crossed the tarmac he turned
and gave the V for victory sign' (Courier Mail [Brisbane],
17 February 1988:1).
— In contrast, a radio news bulletin reported that a squash player
was in some disgrace for having 'flicked a V-sign at the referee'
(April 1989).
Well-known in a culture, emblematic tokens are handy poses for photo-
graphs, and are often named in the captions to such pictures when they
appear in the printed media:
— A photograph of the deportee arriving in England shows him
with right hand held palm forward, index and middle fingers
splayed, and the other digits folded on the palm. The caption
reads 'Victory sign from deported convicted murderer ... at
London's Heathrow airport with his brother, ...' (Courier Mail,
19 February 1988: 10).
— An Australian Olympian is portrayed with fingers crossed: 'Camp
Hill shooter Alan Smith ... keeps his fingers crossed for the three-
position shoot to come' (Courier Mail, 20 September 1988: 49).
— The captain of an Australian rules football team poses with erect
thumb in front of shelves of groceries: 'Roger Merrett, at work
on the Gold Coast, gives the thumbs up for this week's VFL
clash with Hawthorn' (Courier Mail, 5 July 1988: 39).
The gatherer of gestures may suspect the existence of a type for a
culture when a gesture is used in a widespread advertising campaign
without being glossed. Examples of this practice are too numerous to be
given here.
If a type exists, although the gesture may have a still-perceptible
conventional analogy with its conventional object, replicas are modeled
on that type, and concerns for verisimilitude fade to such an extent that
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analogies may be forgotten or irrelevant to everyday production and
interpretation of the gesture (compare Eco's account of the development
of a ratio difficilis into a ratio facilis (e.g., 1976: 240), although it assumes
separation of content and expression). When a French child, for example,
begins to form the telephone sign described by Wylie (1977: 14), Calbris
and Montredon (1986: 138) and Calbris (1990: 105)9 can it be said that
this sign is directly based on those telephones in his/her environment?
How could we explain the amazing similarity in gestures produced by
different children? It is more logical to say that what is imitated is the
sign understood to refer to the telephone. Stylization wrought by centuries
of use can be radical, and even Efron lists amongst his emblems an
Italian gesture for drinking, in which the thumb is lowered to the lips
(1972 [1941]: 181). In Australia, a drinking gesture apparently modeled
on the raising of a glass to the mouth has nonetheless been observed in
a number of bodily locations inappropriate to drinking. Once upon a
time imitation gave birth to a gesture, and as Kendon says: Once
agreement is reached about what was intended, the gestural form that
was successful may become standardized. To the extent that it does so,
it ceases to denote its referent in virtue of the recognition it induces in
its recipient' (1981b: 34; see also 1990: 318). Concerns for mimetic
veracity lost, gestural development may be influenced by other factors.
Necessary distinctiveness from other gestures is one of these; however,
although the Australian emblematic repertoire is richer than might at
first be thought, its sparseness is still such that this does not seem to be
a major force. Certainly, even in cases where the analogical factor no
longer dominates, there may still be a certain consciousness on the part
of the gesturer of the imitative origins of the sign s/he is using. We can
compare Tervoort (1961: 451), while questioning his use of 'natural':
Some gestures stay natural, because the imitation is so well chosen and so easily
recognized, so easily and efficiently performed and so clearly evident; thus, the
concomitant, accompanying association with the object stays consciously present,
which does not necessarily mean that it is the basis of the recognition: more often
it is the helping factor for the recognition by agreement.
Yet this awareness, too, may fade, and so one may simply take the form
and use it, one's not to reason why. Tervoort's 1961 paper on the gestures
of deaf children contains fascinating examples of the process. One anec-
dote, admittedly partially Tervoort's extrapolation, concerns a dimpled
teacher and her deaf pupils. At their first meeting, one child immediately
comments on the dimples, pushing his fingers into his cheeks. From being
a simple description of the feature, the sign comes to mean the teacher
herself, just as a hearing child might use the nickname 'Dimples' (1961:
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448). As an unanalyzed name for a particular teacher, and free from its
original motivation, the gesture is able to accommodate shifts in meaning.
(Compare Johnston [1987: 34-35] on similar processes in Australian sign
language.) Tervoort recounts:
At the time that we found out about [the teacher] (in 1950) she was principal,
and the children themselves did not know why they used for her the sign we
described. For them it was not motivated any longer, unless they thought about
it, or had the sign explained to them. The situation now, after ten years, is even
more interesting, for the sign now means Principal·, Miss Dimples has gone, and
the new principal does not have dimples. (1961: 452)
To read Morris et al. (1979), for example, is to delve into the origins of
gestures which today appear purely arbitrary, but apparently were
descriptive at their inception.
Striking when one studies gesture is the fact that, while emblems of
which the imitative origins are not known exist, there are also gestures
which 'native-gesturers' tend to see as non-conventionalized representa-
tions of actions and objects, but which vary so little in that culture that
they are more properly described as reproductions of types, as is the case
of the telephone gesture given above and various drinking gestures (see
Calbris 1983: 901; 1990: 105, 117). When one looks away from one's
own culture one finds that what were believed to be 'natural, obvious'
gestures are not the only way in which the same significance can be
produced. As Calbris says:
Qu'appelle-t-on geste conventionnel: 4un geste qui resulte d'une convention'. On
le suppose done arbitraire et non motive. Or un geste ä motivation flagrante peut
etre propre a une culture, c'est-a-dire conventionnel et un geste est souvent dit
arbitraire parce qu'on a oublie sa motivation originelle. (1983: 902)
It may be expected that more studies of gesture may further serve to
dispel the myth of the cross-cultural transparency of (originally) imitative
gestures.
To return to Eco, emblematic gestures can be seen to parallel his
category of signs produced by replication 'whose tokens can be indefi-
nitely reproduced according to their type' (1976: 179): compare the
forger's clandestine, painstaking efforts to produce a token of the type
which is the model ten dollar bill with the carefree open performances
of the Churchillian victory-V outside the tally rooms of the world.
Emblems may be reproduced endlessly according to type with their full
value, restrictions not pertaining to the material fact of their reproduction,
but being sociolinguistic ones restraining use in particular circumstances
(cf. Eco 1976: 178).
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Although, as we have seen, Eco (1976: 228) specifically makes a place
for 'coded gestures' amongst replicas, and despite his liberal attitude
towards requisite levels of articulation (see below and Eco 1976: 228 ff)
there is difficulty in fitting emblems into his later descriptions of this
class. The reason for this is that replication, in Eco's schema, is of
combinational units, and it is not immediately obvious that emblems
subdivide into combinable units, nor in many cultures do they themselves
associate to make larger gestural texts. Yet to follow Eco, ease of repro-
duction would be explained because emblems were, or were composed
of, systematic, discrete units. The reproduction of an emblem is much
more simple than that of an artistic masterpiece. Describing the problems
in duplicating a painting by Raphael, which reside at least in part in the
fact that for us the code is novel and imprecise, Eco writes: 'The difficulty
in isolating productive rules is due to the fact that, while in verbal
language there are recognizable and discrete signal-units, so that even a
complex text may be duplicated by means of them, in a painting the
signal looks "continuous" or "dense", without distinguishable units'
(1976: 181). He continues: 'Goodman (1968) remarks that the difference
between representative and conventional signs resides in this opposition
(dense vs. articulate) and it is to this difference that the difficulty in
duplicating paintings is due' (1976: 182). This may be compared with
my comments on the simplification of gestures based on actions as they
become emblematic.
According to Eco, the following three kinds of features may be
replicated:
'(i) Features of a given system that must be combined with features
of the same system in order to compose a recognizable functive'
(1976: 237-238). Obviously, here must be classified verbal lan-
guage, of the celebrated double articulation. As we will see in the
discussion of articulation, we are not in a position to say that
gestures are constituted from a finite set of lesser units. Nor can
we claim for emblems the universal habit of regularly and system-
atically combining with each other as do words: emblems are
more likely to be in paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships
with words than with other emblems.
'(ii) Features from a weakly structured repertoire, recognizable on
the basis of perceptual mechanisms and correlated to their content
by large-scale overcoding, that must not necessarily be combined
with other features' (1976: 238). This lack of precision is incom-
patible with the neat nature of gestural emblems. Nevertheless,
Eco gives stylization as an example of this type of production,10
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and I am claiming that many emblems are stylizations, although
the marge de manoeuvre allowed Eco's stylization seems too large
to apply to them. The degree of invention permitted the painter
of saints or suites of playing cards (cf. Eco 1976: 239-240) is
surely greater than that given to someone who would execute the
thumbs up, or its fellow-emblems.
'(iii) Features of a given system that must be added to a bundle or to
a string of features from one or more systems in order to compose
a recognizable functive' (1976: 238). Again, there are difficulties
in fitting the replica of an emblem into Eco's schema. Possibly
composed of smaller gestural units, it is autonomous: it is charac-
teristic of the emblematic gesture that it can be understood on
its own, without words, and so constitutes a purely gestural sign
with no need (for example), of elements from the verbal system
to make a 'recognizable functive', although the emblem may in
practice often occur in a verbal utterance.
If we choose to say that emblems cannot be divided into smaller
units, we have to say they approach group (iii), but we must replace the
mandate in the criterion for membership and say that they 'can be added
to a bundle or to a string'. Or we can say that emblems are composed
of smaller units, members of group (i), but that the contrastive status of
these may change from emblem to emblem. These questions will be
further discussed in the section on articulation.
Coding. In view of the license for unspecificity given in Eco's classes of
replicas seen above, (points [i]-[iii]), to state that emblems are produced
by replication is obviously insufficient: we must say that an emblematic
type carries quite precise stipulations. There are other gestures of which
the most general interpretations across contexts are similar, but for which
the precise meaning can only be established at each occurrence. Such
are the French gestures of argumentation, worked upon by Genevieve
Calbris and Jacques Montredon. Someone conversant with certain French
gestural codes could only recognize the gestures out of context as those
of argumentation, a more exact interpretation being impossible.
From Efron on (cf. Efron 1972 [1941]: 106), researchers (even if
sometimes tacitly) have presumed that one of the distinctive qualities of
the emblematic gesture is its generality, the independence of its interpreta-
tion from a particular context of use. That definition of the emblem
which describes it as a gesture used without verbal accompaniment implies
the notion of context: the emblem functions without a verbal context.
Experimental evidence adds strength to the claim that for certain gestures,
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interpretation is not heavily context-dependent for native-gesturers.
Calbris (1983) found that facial expression was only of slight significance
for French experimental subjects in understanding filmed French gestures,
but that for Hungarian students, for whom many of these gestures would
not have been emblematic, the context provided by the facial expression
was important, facilitating the guessing of the correct responses. Endowed
with generality, the emblem has currency in situations beyond one partic-
ular context. Not only is it interpreted in the same way in different
contexts, but it can be lifted out of those contexts and discussed in terms
of its type. Thus Kendon (1986: 8) recommends the label 'quotable
gestures', which would encompass emblems.
What does it mean to say that certain gestures depend on the context
(verbal, facial, cultural)? The answer is that the context contains clues
to their interpretation, and interpretation involves knowledge of a code.
Hungarian subjects trying to understand French gestures, because
deprived of the immediate access to the code of a native-gesturer, had to
build it themselves from the contextual clues of the accompanying facial
expressions (which they presumed were not culturally-bound). When I
search the context (verbal and situational) of a previously unseen gesture,
I try to (re)establish a code permitting me to interpret. This code may
have no more currency than the particular situation in which I find myself.
Although all interpretation is dependent upon a code, upon a system
of interpretants, it seems that not all parts of the system are equal: they
may be time-honored, ephemeral, widely-known, or idiosyncratic.
Needing some means of talking about different strengths of coding, I
develop and adapt a notion to which Eco refers briefly (1976: 214) and
which is employed by William Washabaugh in his work on the sign
language of the deaf of a particular small island community: the distinc-
tion between strong and weak coding. Although Eco and Washabaugh
both use this concept in relationship to what they call iconic coding,
much of what Washabaugh has to say seems to correspond usefully to
differences between emblematic and non-emblematic gestures, and thus
to suggest itself as a means of defining the emblem. I suggest that, on
the continuum of strengths of coding, the emblem would be strongly,
but not very strongly, coded.
For my work, firstly, a strong code would be one transcending indivi-
dual situations, reaffirmed, strengthened by use. It is the kind of code to
which members of a particular society have access for the interpretation
of a group of gestures, the emblems. In contrast, according to
Washabaugh, '[t]he meaning of an individual [weakly coded] sign is not
established prior to, or independently of, the utterance of the sign, but
is established in the utterance' (1980: 8; cf. 6, 7, and 13, where weakly
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coded signs are equated with context-dependent ones). Certainly, it is
foolish to make a case for the emblem's total independence from context.
The 'thumbs up' might be translated 'g'day' or 'spot on'. Any language
use is affected in some way by the context. The particular circumstances
of an emblem's use provide clues as to whether it should be interpreted
as a piece of irony, or teasing, or a deadly insult, for example. There are
also instances of gestural homonyms in which semantically unrelated
gestures have the same appearance, and a particular context allows the
appropriate choice of interpretation. (An example of homonymy is the
crossed fingers gestures, used in Australia to sign about both good luck
and friendship.) However, even when an isolated emblem is viewed, as
in an experiment on gesture recognition, it is possible to give a variety
of specific possible meanings. A code exists which is sufficiently powerful
to give a type with these alternatives, rather than interpretation involving
the deduction of possible codes on the basis of the context, too impover-
ished for this purpose in the experimental situation.
Although, as I have said, Washabaugh uses the opposition between
strongly and weakly coded signs in reference to 'iconic' signs (for him,
based on a culturally constructed referent rather than a real object)
(1980: 3ff), the movement to being strongly coded seems to involve
becoming part of a formal system of signs, in which comprehension
depends on recognizing, for example, oppositions between one sign and
another, rather than resemblances between sign and referent (see 1980:
6, 28). He also states 'strongly coded
 ssigns are explicit in their reference
and constrained in their formation'11 (1980: 6; see also 7). So a sign type
is set up which guides the subsequent production of signs. This may be
compared with the development of emblems from other signs, any per-
ceived resemblance to the action or object from which it is derived
becoming less important than the fact that the sign is seen as the token
of a type. We may learn from Washabaugh's comments on factors contrib-
uting to the development of strongly-coded gestures: 'With time, the
comprehension tasks placed on the interpreter by "weakly-coded"
 ssigns
become excessive, and the signers must consequently construct conven-
tional, "strongly coded"
 ssigns to ease the interpreter's task' (1980: 18-19;
see also 28). Obviously even in the context of communities in which
gestural communication is less functionally necessary than on Providence
Island, the development and use of strongly coded signs are favored,
because they presuppose a shared system of interpretants, and so will be
more easily used in that community privy to the code than will individual
inventions. (Compare other articles on the development of sign languages
of the deaf, such as Tervoort 1961 and Frishberg 1975.)
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The justification of codes. Codes may be established on different bases,
may be founded on experience, may be apparently arbitrary, but once
the convention is widely accepted, if considering the functioning of a sign
with reference to a code, it is not necessary to ask if a sign is motivated
or arbitrary (cf. Eco 1976: 222-223 on motivated convention).
Historically, many, if not all, gestures are motivated, but we can use
emblems without thought or recognition of the motivation which gave
the emblem birth. However, to call such a gesture 'arbitrary' is surely as
inappropriate as to call a person no longer in the care and keeping of
the parents who gave her/him life an orphan, or the product of sponta-
neous generation. Furthermore, as Eco (1976: 191) has said, 'the notion
of convention ... is not co-extensive with that of arbitrary link, but... is
co-extensive with that of cultural link1. Any classification on the grounds
of a distinction between motivated and arbitrary is bound to founder.
Does this mean we can cast aside all concerns about motivation? This
proves quite hard to do: once we start to think about them, we do want
our conventions to be reasoned or justified, although when they are
sanctioned, explanations are not necessary to use.
'Justification' is the word used in this study to replace 'motivation' in
some of its senses, because 'motivation' is so often in opposition to
'arbitrary', in an untenable, inoperable system of classification.
Furthermore, another term is to be preferred, because Calbris's influential
work on 'motivation' restricts the word to an analogous link convention-
ally set up between an apparently Saussurian signifiant and signifie. For
example, she writes: 'The word "motivation" is used in its semiotic and
not psychological meaning. It designates the analogical link between the
signifier and signified, i.e., between the physical manifestation of a sign
and its signification' (1990: xvi). That we are not using such a model of
the sign entails that we cannot accept unchanged her account of motiva-
tion in its various forms.12
We like to think that there was some justification for the original
mooting of the code allowing a given gesture. After its inception, the
code may be strengthened by continual use and the persistence of this,
or other forms of justification such as some famous incident, adoption
by a famous figure, or association with a verbal expression. So compelling
is the urge for justification that speculative etymologies are frequent.
Thus the reading of motivation/justification is itself a kind of interpreta-
tion. Powerful evidence of this comes from the phenomenon of what
Morris et al. (1979) call supporting explanations, accounts of the origins
of signs, which, even if doubtful historically, nonetheless strengthen the
code as a form of justification for those using it (see below). It is
noteworthy that no suggested emblem in Hanna (1992a) resists the effort
Brought to you by | University of Queensland - UQ Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 12/16/15 5:42 AM
342 B. E. Hanna
to provide it with a justificatory story. It should be underlined, however,
that knowledge of the originative justification is not necessary to contem-
porary meaning. Indeed, when a history is known, the use of the gesture
could conceivably be inappropriately limited: thus an expert on gestural
motivation suggested to me that only a Christian could make the 'lucky'
crossed fingers, for her transparently analogous with Christ's cross,
whereas I have observed it performed by atheists, Jews, and Christians
of persuasions not accepting the talismanic use of the crucifix. To return
to my metaphor of the generation of life, we can say that the study of
justification is not a study of the mechanics of conception, but of beliefs
about that moment, and of the forces sustaining the life thus begun.
The factors listed below as possible justifications may work together,
and in different cultures, some could be more important than others,
emblematic repertoires reflecting these differences. Efron (1972 [1941]:
121), for example, suggests that pictorialism, a form of analogy, is more
important for Southern Italians than for Eastern European Jews.
Analogy. Following Calbris, I use 'analogy' here to refer to phen-
omena of iconicity, likeness, and resemblance, admitting that the term is
used loosely. It covers, therefore, the interpretation of reproductions of
objects and fictive samples. While reproduction can be of the convention-
ally-constructed object, analogy also proceeds by imagery. This may exist
in verbal language as well: an incomprehensible seminar can be shown
to go 'right over my head', the intention to keep a secret by the sealing
of the lips. (For Australians, and those of some other related cultures,
the relevant gestures are, respectively: the flat hand, with palm down,
and straight, touching fingers pointing across the skull, sweeps backwards
above the head; thumb and forefinger pinch the lips shut and slide across
the mouth.) Although there is no sanctioned resemblance between the
concept of victory and two forked fingers, for many the victory-V works
by analogy, this being between the shape of the fingers and the initial
letter of 'victory', 6victoire\ or 'vrijheid'. However, it should be noted
that speakers of languages without a cognate with initial V now also
use the gesture, and that, as has been stated, for some users it is not only
the initial analogy which is important, for the gesture must also conform
to the crucial necessity of distinguishing it from another item of the
gestural system. We must remember here that, as we have seen in the
section on Peirce's icon, resemblance operates by conventions, and what
counts as similarity is learnt (cf. Eco 1976: 191 if). It also seems
that certain emblematic types set themselves up as being analogies,
although the tokens are produced by replication.
Analogy is a very powerful factor in the creation and sustaining of
many gestures, not only emblems, and as has been said, Calbris would
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maintain that all gestures are so motivated (see, for example, Calbris
1983: 1203; 1990: xvi, 38, 117, 205). Certainly, a presupposition of
Australian and French informants is that a previously unseen gesture
could be motivated by analogy. In my experiments, as in those of Calbris,
subjects interpreting unknown gestures attempted to see the gestures as
in some way pictorial, even if this picture was not of the object, but of
a common metaphor or imagery (see Calbris 1987: 57). Frequent failures
to produce the same interpretations as those familiar with the gesture
demonstrate that 'simply finding one motivation (an analogical link)
among several possible ones does not constitute a successful interpreta-
tion' (Calbris 1990: 38). If people (experimental subjects and researchers)
do believe that all gestures are fundamentally pictorial, a belief which
Efron, logically, must question (see 1972 [1941]: 95), only the bounds of
ingenuity can limit the discovery of iconic links. Thus it is at times
uncertain that the analogy found ever did have any influence on the
ratification of the standard interpretation, or whether it is merely the
product of contemporary inventiveness (see, for example, the wealth of
possible explanations for the obscene V, Morris et al. 1979: 226 ff). Some
directions and movements are so fundamental that they will be found in
many gestures, actions, and so on, giving the impression of iconicity. Eco
(1976: 213), for example, discussing yes/no gestures, concludes: The
truth of the matter is that right and left or forward are such universal
features that they are able to become iconic reproductions of every
phenomenon'. Or as Calbris (1990: 39) writes, '[t]he search for motiva-
tion, or for an assimilation with a known relationship between signifier
and signified, resembles a lottery'. As was seen in the section on Peirce's
icon, what counts as iconicity is unclear in the absence of some
convention.
The analogy consistent with a culture's use of a gesture may be readily
accessible or it may be only available to analysis,13 in which case the
conventional analogy seems weakly coded, and irrelevant to the everyday
operation of the gesture. As stated above, if emblems are produced by
replication, although a motivation or analogy may be responsible for the
type, the token is not produced by analogy with what it signifies.
However, in some cases it appears that the type does set itself up to be
some kind of reproduction of the object and users of the sign may be
unaware that it is not an idiosyncratic analogy.
Modification of a previously existent gesture. Beside the production
of an analogy, the only strategy Calbris notes as used in the interpretation
of an unknown gesture in a test situation is the assimilation of the gesture
to a previously known sign (1990: 38). (Obviously, outside the test
situation, strategic use of the conversational context is possible.) In the
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sense that interpreters are also producers, this assimilation is how many
gestures are produced. An example of the process in my own experimenta-
tion is the repeated interpretation, by many older subjects, of the vertical
spiraling index (a sign of disinterest) as a variant of the horizontal circling
index signifying stupidity, some commenting on the unusual orientation
of the test example. It may also be the case that new gestures are based
on gestures already known, through synthesis or modification. For exam-
ple, in Australia today many people use a gesture in which the lips are
reportedly 'zipped' thus making speech impossible. Although the zip is
a twentieth-century invention, this metaphoric application of it to the
lips had been prefigured in earlier verbal expressions, and it is logical to
posit previous gestures, using other forms of closure, which provided the
inspiration for this sign. (For a better documented but more restricted
gestural development, see Hanna 1992b: 201 ff.)
Existence of a history. Fervid etymologists and historians that we
seem to be, we enjoy anecdotes of the origins and use of gestures, and
the victory-V, of wartime associations, is a good example of this. The
showjumping incident mentioned in the section on communicative intent
renewed British interest in it and its obscene inverted twin: while the
name 'a Harvey Smith' was given to the latter, Smith participated in
advertising campaigns using an unambiguously positive palm-forward
version, (see Morris et al. 1979: 233 ff; according to Partridge 1984: 534,
this name was still in Occasional usage' in 1980).
Publicity. The Harvey Smith incident, in providing an example of a
historical precedent for a gesture, leads us to think of the way in which
the use of a gesture is strengthened by many forms of public exposure
such as advertising campaigns, films, and so on. An already-existent
gesture may be popularized, or a newly-invented one propagated.
Examples include the symmetrical thumbs up, with hands drawn back
towards the body at waist-level, much used by fellow-students in my
adolescence, under the influence of the Fonz from the American comedy
Happy Days. The extra-terrestrial Alf, eponymous star of another
American television show, seems to have had similar success diffusing,
in Australia, the gesture of disgust in which the index finger is thrust
down the throat. However, this latter gesture is not as strongly linked
with Alf as the other is to Fonzie, and one may use it without being seen
to make any reference to him.
Supporting explanations. We have surely all heard that, in a classical
example of audience-participation, spectators at Roman games voted on
the lot of the losing gladiator. Thumbs were held up if he were to be
spared, and down if he were to die. Or so the story, and a good and
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powerful story it is, too, goes. It is, however, historically dubious, hence
its appearance here, rather than under 'Existence of a history'. Despite
various efforts to debunk it (see, for example, Morris 1977 and Morris
et al. 1979), this resilient tale gives a strong, if historically inaccurate,
justification of today's gestures known as thumbs up and thumbs down.
As such, it provides a prime example of what Morris et al. term 'support-
ing explanations': they 'although in a sense untrue, nevertheless come to
act as if they were true, and thereby help to keep the gesture alive by
giving it a satisfying, if incorrect, background' (1979: 266).
Supernatural value. Religious or superstitious beliefs in the efficacy
of particular actions or shapes contribute to the use of certain gestures
which may be regarded as communicative, even when produced as talis-
mans, if we interpret their production as a message to benevolent or
malevolent spirits. In some cases, such as that of the crossed fingers, the
sacred sense fades.
Legislation. In the interests of secrecy, deliberately esoteric gestures
may be devised and decreed. Similarly, according to Morris, a deliberate
decision was taken in 1941 as to the use of the victory-V gesture as part
of a wartime propaganda campaign. Although Churchill contributed his
institutional power to strengthen the conventions, the inventor was the
Belgian lawyer Victor De Lavelaye (Morris et al. 1979: 227).
Consistency with other conventions. Undoubtedly, one of the influen-
tial factors in the initial success and subsequent maintenance of a gesture
is the way in which it works with other conventions, such as those of
verbal imagery. Whether we choose to regard verbal expressions as the
cause or effect of various emblems, and this varies from case to case, the
existence of an associated verbal expression which may even be used
independently of the gesture serves to make the latter familiar and further
cements the conventions allowing its use. (For example, 'Queen's visit
given outback thumbs-up' says a headline in the Courier Mail, 24 April
1988, without necessarily implying that any thumb was raised.) This is
but one instance of the way in which the verbal and gestural systems
work together, suggesting that both are part of the same overall semi-
otic system.
Conclusions. The emblem is a particular move to be looked at and
interpreted in similar ways in a variety of contexts. It therefore can be
described as a strongly coded gestural sign, the strength of the coding
explaining why it is that the gesture is so context-independent, the com-
parative context-independence explaining why emblems can be used with-
out the accompaniment of speech. This description of the emblem takes
into account that important relationship between the emblem and conven-
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tion which so many definitions of it describe and explains why it might
be akin to Peirce's symbol, which works by convention. This is not to
say that emblems are those signs which are conventional, or even highly
conventional, for I am claiming that convention is necessary to the
functioning of each sign. What I am saying is that the interpretation of
emblems is governed by strong habits, that emblems are ruled by strong
conventions, thus being conventionalized to the point of generality.
Weak coding and strong coding are degrees of the same quality, and
I do not imply either that the codes governing the production of non-
emblems are always ephemeral, or that the conventions surrounding the
use of emblematic gestures are immutable. Progress takes place in both
directions on the scale of coding: the coding of some gestures may gain
in strength, and strong codes weaken as they fall into disuse. Change is
part of the gestural, as of all, semiotic systems.
In explaining and discussing the emblem as a fairly strongly coded
gesture, I have shown the difficulty of maintaining a distinction between
iconic and symbolic — or motivated and arbitrary — gestures, symbolism
and arbitrariness traditionally being characteristic of the emblem. Iconic
or analogical gestures may conventionally resemble the possible object,
but in the case of emblems, we may question whether this resemblance
is the basis of the sign's functioning. To produce the meaning 'telephone'
or Til have a drink', we are less concerned with making viable pictures
of a telephone, or a drink, than with recreating an already established
pattern. I would distinguish between those signs which are claimed to be
analogical transformations of other signs, interpretation being dependent
on seeing that transformation; and those claiming to be incarnations,
replicas of canonized signs, interpretation depending on according the
status of replica. In the former case (examples of which would be drawings
of gestures, paintings, a rising intonation used to describe increasing
altitude, newly invented descriptive gestures), the interpretant tells the
interpreter that this is a sign which is to be understood as a transformation
of the properties of another. Certainly, it is still ruled by convention (we
have conventions telling us how to paint to give the effect of perspective,
what descriptive words to use to produce a certain sense), yet the resulting
sign is not the closely-bound reproduction of another, it is not a replica.
(For another statement of the same case, see McNeill 1986: 107.) A
gesture produced in such a manner would not be an emblem. However,
the study of emblems shows that there are some replicas whose types
must be considered as analogies (for example, drinking gestures) and that
the existence of these types may not always be obvious to those using
them, who, even if aware of intracultural uniformity, are frequently
ignorant of intercultural diversity. At the same time, the descriptive birth
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of many emblems is forgotten or secondary. For the uninitiated (for
example, the foreigner), some such emblems may be comprehensible
because of this original role, but for those who commonly use them they
no longer function descriptively (cf. Calbris 1990: 39). That we may be
able to understand the apparently analogical gesture of a foreigner,
although we would never use it, does not make it any less a part of that
foreign culture's gestural repertoire, or any less interesting as an object
of study.
Further research: Questions of articulation
For many, an orthodox description of the sign-type under examination
will include comments on the articulation of that sign. Even if, as will
become evident, conclusive treatment of emblematic articulation is not
crucial to our definition, discussion of the question is helpful in that it
shows the limitations of the verbocentric approach with its insistence
that the status of natural language be dependent on the discernment of
double articulation, and also suggests areas for future research. The
question of articulation is one upon which we have, of necessity, touched
in previous discussion with relation to two points: first, the verbocentric
requirement; and second, the present difficulties in determining whether
emblematic gestures are composed of combinable units. Andre Martinet's
theory of double articulation refers to having choices at two levels in
language: there are units which are distinctive, but not significant, pho-
nemes, and which combine to form meaningful elements; these latter
allowing choice at the level of the first articulation (Ducrot and Todorov
1972: 73 ff; Galisson and Coste 1976: 50). Therefore, if the emblem, or
any other gesture, is taken as a minimal meaningful unit, it should be
possible to subdivide it into smaller, meaningless, but distinctive elements.
If convinced that gestures should be regarded as fully signs, there are
three obvious responses to the mandate. The first is compliance, necessi-
tating attempted analysis into two levels. Or the relevance of levels of
articulation may be maintained, but not restricted to two. Thirdly, the
necessity of double articulation may be repudiated, and along with it the
attempt to analyse gestures in terms of any levels of articulation. The
following exploration, which provides few answers, attempts to sketch
how one might take each of these three approaches. It is not so much a
practical discussion of actual discovery procedures as an overview of the
issues involved.
Double articulation. The challenge to find two levels of articulation, and
thus publicly to confer the status of language, has been taken up success-
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fully by students of various sign languages of the deaf, notably Stokoe.
With emblems, the situation is less clear. The search for the equivalent
of phonemes is hindered by the fact that since emblematic gestures do
not constitute an autonomous language, and in many cultures do not
combine with each other to permit complete conversations, systems of
analysis produced by some researchers are not even applicable. Others,
such as Kendon (1981b: 34), consider that systems of analysis should
take into account his perceived coherence of all gestural behavior. Many
attempts have been made to break down kinesic behavior into smaller
units.14 While the ostensible project is that of finding some means of
transcribing gestures, it may also be seen as inspired at times by the
search for levels of articulation. Both projects entail the search for smaller
units in a string of gestural behavior, although ultimately the two quests
do differ. If only a system of notation is targeted, the significative aspect
of the movements can be ignored, whereas analysis for levels of articula-
tion must recognize it in order to establish the distinctiveness of certain
traits. I do not propose to investigate here the relative merits of different
systems of analysis, but rather to produce some hypotheses and general
remarks about what such analyses might discover. Firstly, let us note
that the dearth of information on emblems as comprised of lesser units
indicates that although emblems themselves may exist and be accepted
by a community, smaller units are less consciously known. This of course
does not mean that they could not be found: researchers into sign lan-
guages must assert that the units they have isolated are often unwittingly
used by practitioners of the languages concerned.
Secondly, since it has been suggested that many emblems are fossiliza-
tions of what were once code-making moments of signification working
by analogy, is it reasonable to expect that they will have two constant
levels of articulation? Eco sees codes for the rather motley class of iconic
signs as so variable that he repudiates the case for fixed iconic elements
parallel to phonemes. This is the context in which he introduces strong
and weak coding: iconic codes are weak and the value of the elements
unstable (cf. Eco 1976: 215). He concludes that a sign perceived to be
iconic 'must be viewed as: (a) a visual text which is (b) not further
analyzahle either into signs or mtofigurae9 (1976: 215). ('Figurae9 is the
Hjelmslevian term he uses for units of the second articulation.) We may
note the claim that an iconic sign is parallel to a text, a description,
rather than a word, 'except in rare cases of considerable schematization'
(1976:215).
At the level of each emblem, the system is strongly coded, but is the
same the case for lesser elements, if such exist? It has been shown that
the case of the emblem, produced by replication, is one of stability,
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reaffirmation of a convention, rather than code-making, and that the
term 'iconic' sign is inappropriate, in that it is not the recognition of an
analogy which allows the production of signification. Nonetheless, it
could be argued that the mark of the iconic history of many emblems is
the difficulty in locating lesser elements. Alternatively, it could be said
that the stylization process involves remodeling of the original gesture
according to an established system of articulation and oppositions, and
this is certainly the account which has been given of the development of
gestures in sign languages of the deaf (see Frishberg 1975, Johnston 1987:
33). Perhaps the transition to emblematic status also involves remodeling,
just as the supposedly onomatopoeic 'wuff-wuff corresponds to the
normal phonetic possibilities of English. Here more research is needed.
One study addressing the question is that undertaken by Sparhawk.
Drawing upon work done in phonemics, and upon Stokoe's research on
the articulation of sign languages, she attempts 'the application of linguis-
tic analysis to the study of Iranian emblems' (Sparhawk 1981 [1978]:
422). Her conclusion is that when gestures are part of an 'adjunct' system
(as she says emblems are), rather than a full-blown language, this kind
of remapping is unnecessary and does not always occur (1981 [1978]:
427, 437): 'since emblems tend to occur separately from one another and
not in complex sequences, and since there are fewer of them, they can
still be formed according to iconic principles' (Kendon 1981b: 33, summa-
rizing Sparhawk). This is Sparhawk's evidence for her claim that emblems
are iconic, but as I have shown in the previous section, the term 'iconic'
is inappropriate for emblems, which do not necessarily continue to signify
through resemblance. Note that Sparhawk claims only greater, rather
than total, iconicity for emblems. In the Persian emblematic system, as
in the Australian, distinctive traits exist. Such contrastive features as can
be isolated are obviously not iconic in origin, but are nonetheless context-
specific. The oppositional value of the palm forward/palm back option
is restricted to certain contexts, such as that of the V signs. (The crossed
fingers translated 'here's hoping' and 'friendship' can both be performed
with palm forward or palm back.)
Thus we find ourselves in a quandary. The lack of double articulation
is a mark of a weakly coded sign, according to Washabaugh (1980), and,
following him, Kendon. Taking the notion of coding as a means of
replacing that of iconicity, Kendon writes that strongly coded gestures
'are produced in the same way each time and ... must possess specific
features to be regarded as being correctly produced'. He continues:
'Gestures with these properties can be described in terms of combinations
of sets of contrasting features ... (198 Ib: 35). While emblems are excluded
by the latter part of this description, they do not fit his model of weakly
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coded signs since these 'vary extensively in their form and serve to convey
the concepts which they refer to in virtue of reminding the recipient of
the features shared by the concept in question' (1981b: 35). Washabaugh,
who explicitly links double articulation and strong coding, writes (1980:
12): The salient features of such "weakly coded" signs may be hard to
define. That is, the constituents of such signs are not distinct and do not
correspond to linguistic phonemes because they lack oppositional value'.
Unlike emblems, such signs are understood by the recognition of analogy.
If Sparhawk's findings can be generalized to all emblems, we are forced
to the conclusion that emblems are not very strongly coded, and that
this weakness stems from analogous origins, and the sparseness of the
emblematic system. The code is apparently weak in the sense that what
may be a pertinent feature in one case may not be elsewhere. Nonetheless,
while at the level of the figurae, it may be that a code does not hold from
one sign to another, the production of an emblem is certainly not a case
of total code destruction or creation: it cannot be said that the production
of an emblem 'met en crise un code preexistant' as does that of iconic
signs (Eco 1970: 23).
At this juncture, I still take the position that emblems are strongly
(but not very strongly) coded. There may well be lesser units not yet
isolated, and/or to say that the lesser units must be distinctive may be to
follow uselessly the model of verbal language. Strong coding seems in all
other respects to be a useful means of describing the emblematic.
To continue with our hypotheses about minimal emblematic units, we
might surmise that, in the same way that all languages' phoneme pools
are not identical, so the lesser units of gestures would differ across
cultures. Collaborative evidence is found in the work of Efron, who
writes, for example: 'As a rule [the traditional Italian's] fingers participate
in the gestural movement as undifferentiated parts of the arm-lever, rather
than as separate members, as in the case of the ghetto Jew' (1972 [1941]:
116).15 Sparhawk notes (1981 [1978]: 424) an informant's comment that
although the researcher's performances of Persian gestures were recogniz-
able, they had an 'accent'. This could perhaps be attributable to her
retention of an American 'gestural phonology'. This brings us to the
interesting question of the meeting of gestural traditions, particularly
pertinent in a multicultural country such as Australia. In the case of
immigrant cultures bringing their gestures to the wider Australian reper-
toire, what would happen to the supposed system of lesser units? Would
the gestures be reshaped according to our dimly perceived system? Would
they enrich ours? (Sparhawk [1981 (1978): 424] states '[e]mblems "bor-
rowed" from Western films or learned in travels may add features to the
[Persian] set commonly used'.) Or would the whole articulatory system
become hopelessly multivalent?
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Although it does not prove the non-existence of two articulatory levels,
it is obvious that no system of gestural analysis which would correspond
to that demonstrating double articulation in verbal language is made
explicit in our culture. While many pedagogical methods teach the child
phonemes as well as a vocabulary, there is no 'Baby's first finguistics'.
Various articulatory possibilities. The foregoing discussion of double
articulation has shown some of the difficulties in setting up minimal
gestural units. Perhaps another approach would be more fruitful? In his
discussion of the replication of combinable units, Eco extends the gamut
of articulatory options, following Luis Prieto (1966). While analysis in
terms of double articulation is still possible, also available are systems
with only either the first or the second articulation levels; those with no
articulation; and those with mobile articulation (Eco 1976: 229 if). His
list of articulatory possibilities contains a number of places where
emblems hypothetically might be classified, awaiting more experimental
evidence.
For the first options, the emblem must be termed a 'super-sign',16
which is not inconsistent with the description of it as possessing 'a direct
verbal translation usually consisting of a word or two or a phrase'
(Johnson et al. 1981 [1975]: 402). Now, if we decide that emblems are
'super-signs which cannot be further analyzed in compositional elements'
(Eco 1976: 232), we would then say that they made up a system without
articulation. While this has its attractions, it fails to account for those
lesser distinctive features which have been isolated. The existence of lesser
units in manual sign languages perturbs the certainty with which this
case could be stated. If these super-signs could be segmented, but only
into meaningless units, we would have a code with nothing other than
the second articulation. This appears to be Christian Metz's position: he
reports that the significant gesture has been found to be equivalent to
the phrase rather than the word. This 'gestural phrase' does not support
analysis into smaller meaningful units, and therefore it has been con-
cluded that there is no evidence of the level of first articulation in gestures.
However, there exist units distinguishing one gesture from another, and
which may be termed figurae (Metz 1969: 536). (Obviously, gesture
languages, such as those of the deaf, are a different case.)
If suitable discovery procedures could be developed so that any given
string of kinesic activity could be broken down into lesser meaningful
units, and if it was thought suitable to call these strings 'main units' it
might be possible to treat the gestural system as a code with only the
first articulation: 'the main units [chunks of kinesic activity?] can be
analyzed into signs [gestures?] but not thereafter into figurae9 (Eco 1976:
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232). However, given that concatenate emblems do not often appear, in
Australia at least, such procedures would have to deal with the non-
discreteness and imprecision of much non-emblematic gesturing.
It is when discussing the extremely rare case of a system with three
articulations that Eco refers to kinesic figurae. Indeed, they are the lowest
elements in cinematographic language, the only instance of this which he
can suggest. However, they are created by the separate frames of film:
'In everyday life, it is rather difficult to isolate such discrete moments of
a gestural continuum: but this does not hold true for the camera'
(1976:234).
Deferring the question. The third approach to the articulatory mandate,
in contesting the necessity of double articulation, rejects the relevance of
any questions of articulation. Without going as far as a definitive rejec-
tion, I suggest that in the present state of play deferral may be a strategic
move: evidently emblems can be studied as signs without their articulation
being demonstrated. An investigation of articulation to test the validity
of the models proposed above would be a major undertaking in itself. A
crucial question is whether there would be a general articulatory system
for gestural behavior. Sparhawk, for example, does not restrict her analy-
sis to confirmed emblems, but uses her entire gestural corpus (1981
[1978]: 427). If the whole gestural system were articulated identically,
then there would be no need for specifications about emblematic articula-
tion in a definition of this particular class.
Perhaps emblems, because of their capacity to be substituted for words,
and their nearness to the signs of sign language, are composed of minimal
units; perhaps the move to strong coding also entails the strong codifica-
tion of lesser units. On the other hand, Sparhawk tells us that the
codification of minor distinctive traits is not necessary, because there is
but a restricted repertoire of emblems, as opposed to units of a sign
language, and they are such that confusion is infrequent. Constraints of
time and space have meant that this is a largely uncharted area in the
present study. In the context of a work so concerned with the universality
of the role of convention, it is worrying that there is no clear convention
for emblematic units. What is sure is that if we can so easily replicate an
emblem, it must have some order: does this order extend to units consti-
tuting each emblem?
Conclusion
In this article I have sought to redefine the emblem, showing why this is
desirable, and proposing a definition which treats it as a sign amongst
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other signs, rather than a behavior pattern distinguished by a typical
relationship with words. Thus we are enabled to talk about how emblems
work in ways other than word replacers, how it is that they are so often
used in photographs, featured in advertising, for example. To treat the
emblem as a surrogate word is to fail to recognize the potential of the
gestural sign as well as the significance attached to the choice of such a
sign over a verbal one. Furthermore, escaping the bonds of a verbocentric
model, we can gain from the tools of a wider semiotics, and use it to
draw together, in a systematic way, many observations about the nature
of the gestures set apart by previous definitions. The definition proposed
is designed to be coherent with those already in existence. While we have
rejected a definition based on some distinction between motivated and
arbitrary gestures, or the existence of analogy between object and gesture,
the link to Efron's work is there in that the newly defined emblem is
strongly conventional, has generality between contexts and is not depen-
dent on the recognition of some analogous link. Furthermore, the posited
existence of well-known types of these emblems explains their relative
context-independence, and thus their capacity to be used without words.
In conclusion, then, I can do no more than direct the reader to the
definition set out at the beginning of this article.
If rules are made to be broken, conventions are made to be negotiated.
While this article has stressed the power of convention, it has simulta-
neously reargued and examined the justification of many of the conven-
tions which have made it possible: those of the conventional definition.
Although conventions may be maintained by one individual, they take
on their power as something of corporate value. It is the wish of this
author that the renegotiated conventions she proposes may be taken up
by others, either in acquiescence or in fruitful disagreement.
Note
This article is based on doctoral research undertaken under the supervision of
Dr. Jacques Montredon (CLA Besancon), whom I would like to thank for help and
support during his time at the University of Queensland. Writing on Peirce would
have been impossible without advice given by Ms. Anne Freadman (University of
Queensland), but she is not to blame for what has been done with it. Thanks also go
to Dr. Anna Shnukal (University of Queensland) for her comments on an earlier
version of the text. Dr. J.-M. Raynaud, in an undergraduate course in semiotics at
the University of Queensland in 1983, used the concept of the kind of quasi-authorial
role I employ in my analysis of levels of intention, referring to this role as the FAISEUR.
Some sections of the article, principally those on replication and the justification of
codes, are based on my previous publication, 'Justifying gestures' (Hanna 1992b). The
material is reproduced with the permission of the editor and the author.
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2. Although Efron's words have been retained here, the order of presentation has been
changed to group together points relevant to the one kind of 'meaning*.
3. Interestingly, it is with his interpretation of an incident concerning nothing other than
a famous gesture, one demonstrated to Ludwig Wittgenstein by Piero Sraffa, that Eco
supports his thesis that what is unspeakable is not unsignable. (See Eco 1976: 173;
Malcolm 1958: 69.)
4. Although this section treats mediation, the anchor of the mind is present.
5. Though common, the restriction is not universal: 'Emblems can involve actions in any
part of the body, although typically they involve the hands, head orientation, facial
muscular movement, or posture' (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 358).
6. Ekman and Friesen (1969: 56) write: 'Communicative acts are not necessarily accurate
conveyors of information. We are not restricting the term to only those instances
where the decoded information fits the information intended by the sender; those
instances we would call accurate communication and there can be miscommunicative
or inaccurate communicative behavior as well'.
7. In connection with this, it would be fascinating to read the proceedings of an actual
official inquiry into the intention of a gesture, to see what was offered as evidence.
The crux of the case, held in England in the early 1970s, was to determine the intent
of Harvey Smith, a show-jumper: had he made his 'V to celebrate victory or to insult
the judges, thus meriting disqualification? (See Morris et al. 1979: 235; Partridge
1984: 534.)
8. As part of a third-year French course at the University of Queensland, students kept
journals recording observed French gestures and idioms. The following section from
one journal is translated to show how a thoughtful novice in the field of gesture study
finds herself confronted with the issue of communicative intention. The reflections
stem from watching a French film in which a depressed character rests her head on
her hand:
It is interesting to consider the difference between a pose like this, and a more deliberate gesture
like "au poiF ['fantastic', diagram shows an almost complete thumb and index circle, the other
fingers erect]. It could be said that all gestures are unconscious, but I believe that there is a real
difference between these two examples: the pose [of the film character] is a natural human reaction
to an unwelcome event. This expresses the emotions to others, of course, but it was not her
intention; she did not have an intention.
But the gesture with the hand ... for 'au poiF is a way of actively communicating an idea. It is
true thai this gesture can be unconscious when you often use it. The difference between the pose
and the gesture is the intention to communicate. (Mills 1989; my translation)
9. Although Calbris (1983: 912) describes the gestures as produced by the hand held as
if grasping a telephone receiver, with thumb and ring finger extended, Wylie (1977)
and Calbris and Montredon (1986) show the ring finger folded on to the palm, and
the little finger extended. The standardization of this gesture is evidenced by the fact
that French members of the audience corrected me when I quoted Calbris 1983: 912
during a seminar, referring to the 'annulaire' 'ring finger' rather than ''auriculaire1
'little finger'.
10. Eco (1976: 238) defines stylizations as 'apparently "iconic" expressions that are in
fact the result of a convention establishing that they will not be recognized because
of their similarity to a content model, but because of their similarity to an expression-
type which is not strictly compulsory and permits many free variants'.
11. Note Washabaugh's convention: 'sSign (or ssign) will be used throughout this paper
to refer to semiotic sign as opposed to manual sign' (1980: 34).
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12. Those conversant with the detailed work of Calbris will immediately see where some
of our differences lie. For example, I cannot concur with her in saying that a particular
gesture may have two meanings because doubly motivated, i.e., because two analogical
links tie the form to two different meanings. Hence I prefer to write of homonymy,
rather than doubly motivated signs: thus there would be two crossed-fingers signs,
coinciding configurations, each justified differently, rather than one form with bonds
to different packages of meaning ('friends' and 'good luck').
13. Calbris's work of analysis for analogy is reminiscent of a characteristic of the Peircean
icon, its capacity to yield information further to the immediately obvious. She goes
beyond what is generally needed to make a successful interpretation.
14. For example, see Boussiac (1973) where he discusses a variety of notation systems for
movement. He tries to make a case for 'the recording of movement in a completely
objective and digital form by way of a mechanical recording device' (Kendon 198 Ib:
14). Whether complete objectivity is possible is doubtful, as is whether it would even
be useful to achieve it (cf. Kendon 1981b: 15; Freedman 1981 [1975]).
15. 'This statement refers exclusively to non-pictorial movement, the Southern Italian
employing his fingers rather often, in an independent fashion, in the execution of his
relatively numerous descriptive and symbolic gesture-"words"' (Efron 1972 [1941]:
116).
16. Eco (1976: 231) writes: 'there are signs whose content is not a content-unit but an
entire proposition; this phenomenon does not occur in verbal language but it does
occur in many other semiotic systems; granted that they have the same function as
verbal sentences, we shall call these non-verbal sentences "super-signs"'.
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